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OPTIMIZACION Y REPARTO EN PROBLEMAS DE DECISION MULTI-AGENTE CON APLICACIONES EN GESTION DE INVENTARIOS

MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-100, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431G/01
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource

  • Gutierrez, Elisabeth
  • Llorca, Natividad
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
  • Sánchez Soriano, Joaquín
In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier that controls a limited resource and a finite set of manufacturers who need to purchase this resource. We analyze the effect of the limited resource on the horizontal cooperation of manufacturers. To this end, we use cooperative game theory and the existence of stable distributions of the total profit among the manufacturers as a measure of the possibilities of cooperation. The game theoretical model that describes the horizontal cooperation involves externalities, which arise because of the possible scarcity of the limited resource and the possible coalition structures that can be formed. Furthermore, manufacturers do not know how the supplier will allocate the limited resource, therefore, how much of this resource they will obtain is uncertain for all concerned. Nevertheless, when the limited resource is not scarce for the grand coalition, the existence of stable distributions of the total profit is guaranteed and consequently the collaboration among the manufacturers is profitable for them all. In the event that the limited resource is insufficient for the grand coalition, we introduce a new cooperative game that assesses the expectations of each coalition of manufacturers regarding the amount of the limited resource they can obtain. We analyze two extreme expectations: the optimistic and the pessimistic. In the optimistic case, we cannot reach a conclusion regarding the full cooperation of the manufacturers. In the pessimistic case, with one reasonable assumption, the existence of stable distributions of the total profit is guaranteed and as a result the collaboration among manufacturers is a win–win deal., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, Fundación Séneca | Ref. 19320/PI/14
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On coalition formation in a non-convex multi-agent inventory problem

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2616-y., [Abstract]: A multi-agent inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual inventory problems and can coordinate their orders to reduce costs. This paper analyses a multi-agent inventory problem in which each agent faces a continuous-review inventory problem, with a deterministic linear demand, no holding costs and a limited capacity warehouse. In the case under study, shortages are allowed as follows. Goods are bought from an external supplier and then they are stored in each agent’s warehouse. These stored goods usually satisfy demand. However, each agent may alternative produce their own goods, which are less costly but of lower quality. When a shortage of the purchased goods occurs, demand is satisfied with the produced goods until a new order arrives. The problem under study herein arises in a farming community, and is a variation of a problem addressed by Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2015). However, the existence of two acquisition costs makes it substantially different from Fiestras-Janeiro et al.’s problem and significantly complicates its analysis since the resulting cost functions may now be non-convex. This paper establishes the optimal inventory policies for our problem and obtains a stable order structure when agents allocate the joint costs using a proportional rule. In addition, it illustrates the performance of our model and results in an example., Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2011-27731-C03-01, MTM2011-27731-C03-03, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P and MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6, [Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions to improve this article. This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grants PGC2018-097965-B-100, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, MTM2014-54199-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the European Regional Development Fund (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Estimation of the Owen Value Based on Sampling

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the paper has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73848-2_33., [Abstract]: In this paper we introduce a procedure based on sampling to estimate the Owen value of a cooperative game. It is an adaptation of an analogous procedure for the estimation of the Shapley value, and it is specially useful when dealing with games having large sets of players. We provide some results in order to choose a sample size guaranteeing a bound for the absolute error with a given probability, and illustrate our procedure with an example taken from the game theoretical literature., This work has been supported by MINECO grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16, [Abstract]: In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs., Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01), Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01