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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identifed by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy- proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satis es the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satis es the increasing intersection property we de ne an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Goal-oriented agents in a market

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Quérou, Nicolas
We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goal-oriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Agency theory meets matching theory

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a function of the characteristics of all the market participants, as well as the joint attributes of the principal-agent pairs that partner in equilibrium. Moreover, considering each principal-agent relationship as part of a market may strongly influence our assessment of how the characteristics of the principal and the agent affect the optimal incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the matching between principals and agents that we may observe at equilibrium, compared to the matching that would happen if incentive concerns were absent.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Value-free reductions

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sun, Chaoran|||0000-0001-7441-3404
We introduce the value-free (v-f) reductions, operators that map a coalitional game played by a set of players to another "similar" game played by a subset of those players. We propose properties that v-f reductions may satisfy, we provide a theory of duality, and we characterize several v-f reductions (among which the value-free version of the reduced games proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989, and Oishi et al., 2016). Unlike reduced games, introduced to characterize values in terms of consistency, v-f reductions are not defined in reference to values. However, a v-f reduction induces a value. We characterize v-f reductions that induce the Shapley, the stand-alone, and the Banzhaf values. We connect our approach to the theory of implementation. Finally, our new approach is a valuable tool to provide new characterizations of values in terms of consistency. We present new characterizations of the Banzhaf and the stand-alone values.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Organizational structure and technological investment

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Matsushima, Noriaki
  • Shinohara, Ryusuke
We analyze firms' decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game, a solution concept weaker than the core

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda
In the one-sided assignment game, any two agents can form a trade; they can decide to form a partnership and agree on how to share the surplus created. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. Hence the core, which coincides with the set of stable payoffs, may be empty. We introduce the idea of tradewise-stable (t-stable) outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes where all trades are stable; that is, no matched agent can form a blocking pair with any other agent, neither matched nor unmatched. We propose the set of constrained-optimal (optimal) t-stable outcomes, the set of the maximal elements of the set of t-stable outcomes, as a natural solution concept for this game. We prove that this set is non-empty, it coincides with the set of stable outcomes when the core is non-empty, and it satisfies similar properties to the set of stable outcomes even when the core is empty. We propose a partnership formation process that starts withthe outcome where every player stands alone, goes through steps where the set of active players expands, always forming t-stable outcomes, and ends in an (in any) optimal t-stable outcome. Finally, we also use the new concept to establish conditions under which the core is non-empty.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Education choices and job market characteristics

  • Liu, Qianshuo
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
We propose a simple three-stage model where heterogeneous schools compete via tuition fees, individuals with the ex-ante unknown ability make their education choices to (eventually) get a diploma and reveal their ability, and finally the job market determines the assignment of workers to firms and the equilibrium wages. In equilibrium, wages in the labor market and schools' fees and individuals' school choices are strongly related. We also analyze the effects of the existence of a public school or a subsidy on social welfare.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

A model of protests, revolution, and information

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries' ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution's success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogeneity of preferences in the population, and the number of contacts. We extend the analysis by examining the effects of homophily on learning: people are more likely to meet others who have similar preferences, undercutting learning. We introduce variants of our model to discuss other ways of learning about the support for a revolution. We discuss why holding mass protests before a revolt provides more informative signals of people's willingness to actively participate than other less costly forms of communication (e.g., via social media). We also show how outcomes of revolutions in one region can inform citizens of another region and thus trigger (or discourage) neighboring revolutions. We also discuss the role of governments in avoiding revolutions and learning about their citizens' concerns; in particular, by observing the strength of protests and counter-protests.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

'Information doesn't want to be free', informational shocks with anonymous online platforms

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
Anonymous information platforms (e.g. Airbnb) provide information about experience goods while keeping agents' identity hidden until the transaction is completed. In doing so, they generate heterogeneity in the information levels across consumers. In this paper, I show that such platforms induce a weak increase of fine prices and that only low-valuation goods are cheaper online than offline. Platforms always lead to an increase in profits. In terms of consumer welfare, the platform equilibrium is Pareto superior for low-and high-valuation goods, while for intermediate ranges some buyers benefit while others lose from the presence of the platform.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Does the winner take it all?, redistributive policies and political extremism

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Sas, Willem
The impact of federal policies often depends on fixed regional differences (economic, historical, geographical). Certain regions can therefore be seen as permanently benefiting from the federation and others as losing. We show that this distorts voting behaviour in two ways. First, voters strategically elect federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Second, they suboptimally invest in locally funded goods. This distortion is U-shaped in expected federal benefits. Lastly, we do not observe the usual race to be included in the federal coalition, which would reduce the distortion. We test these predictions on national and European Parliamentary elections since 1990, and find that extreme voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing states distort more than those in the middle. We conclude that federal political structures foment political polarisation, especially when federal decisions require large consensus. Loosening the ties between representatives and their constituency may mitigate this problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods economy

  • Chatterji, Shurojit
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.