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ANALISIS TEORICO Y EMPIRICO DEL COMPORTAMIENTO DE INDIVIDUOS Y EMPRESAS CON ESPECIAL ENFASIS EN INNOVACION, SALUD Y EL MERCADO DIGITAL

PGC2018-094348-B-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2018
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 15
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mixture-betweenness, uncertainty and commitment

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper develops axiomatic models of preference under uncertainty and preference for commitment that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness, a weakening of the Independence axiom originally proposed by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986). A central contribution of the paper is a general representation theorem that can be applied across a wide range of domains.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: applicants, panellists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Liu, Qianshuo
  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Pérez Castrillo, David
We analyse if and how the characteristics of grant research panels affect the applicants' likelihood of obtaining funding and, especially, if particular types of panels favour particular types of applicants. We use the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) award decisions to test the similar-to-me hypothesis for the first time in the grant context. Our main results indicate that panel members tend to favour more (or penalise less) applicants with similar characteristics to them, as the similar-to-me hypothesis suggests. We show, for instance, that the quality of the applicants is more critical for panels of high quality than for panels of relatively lower quality, that basic-oriented panels tend to penalise applied-oriented applicants, and that panels with fewer female members tend to penalise teams with more female applicants. As a whole, we show that similar-to-me effects are simultaneously at work for a wide variety of functional, job-related research characteristics as well as for more well-known demographic attributes., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Feder (PGC2018-094348-B-I00, PID2019-109377GB-I00, and PID2021-122403NB-I00), Generalitat de Catalunya (2021 SGR 00194), Fellowship PRE2018-084457, Severo Ochoa programme (CEX2019-000915-S), and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Early individual stakeholders, first venture capital investment, and exit in the UK startup ecosystem

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Nieto-Postigo, Jonás
  • Pérez Castrillo, David
We create a novel, comprehensive dataset of UK-based startups with extensive information on ownership, control, and valuation. Our database provides unique descriptive evidence about the relevance of individual stakeholders in startups, particularly before the entry of venture capital institutional investors. We compare the influence of two comparable characteristics of various groups of pre-institutional individual stakeholders: size and experience. We show that the quantity as well as the experience, of founders, directors, and other individual investors correlate with the startup’s type of, and value at, exit. Success results are very different across types of diversity: functional diversity appears to have a positive relationship with success whereas that of demographic diversity is negative., We acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Feder (ECO2016-76998-P, PGC2018-094348-B-I00, PID2021-122403NB-I00), Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2021SGR-00194), ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme, and Severo Ochoa Programme (CEX2019-000915-S).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: applicants, panellists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Liu, Qianshuo
  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Pérez Castrillo, David
We analyse if and how the characteristics of grant research panels affect the applicants' likelihood of obtaining funding and, especially, if particular types of panels favour particular types of applicants. We use the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) award decisions to test the similar-to-me hypothesis for the first time in the grant context. Our main results indicate that panel members tend to favour more (or penalise less) applicants with similar characteristics to them, as the similar-to-me hypothesis suggests. We show, for instance, that the quality of the applicants is more critical for panels of high quality than for panels of relatively lower quality, that basic-oriented panels tend to penalise applied-oriented applicants, and that panels with fewer female members tend to penalise teams with more female applicants. As a whole, we show that similar-to-me effects are simultaneously at work for a wide variety of functional, job-related research characteristics as well as for more well-known demographic attributes., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Feder (PGC2018-094348-B-I00, PID2019-109377GB-I00, and PID2021-122403NB-I00), Generalitat de Catalunya (2021 SGR 00194), Fellowship PRE2018-084457, Severo Ochoa programme (CEX2019-000915-S), and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Early individual stakeholders, first venture capital investment, and exit in the UK startup ecosystem

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Nieto-Postigo, Jonás
  • Pérez Castrillo, David
We create a novel, comprehensive dataset of UK-based startups with extensive information on ownership, control, and valuation. Our database provides unique descriptive evidence about the relevance of individual stakeholders in startups, particularly before the entry of venture capital institutional investors. We compare the influence of two comparable characteristics of various groups of pre-institutional individual stakeholders: size and experience. We show that the quantity as well as the experience, of founders, directors, and other individual investors correlate with the startup’s type of, and value at, exit. Success results are very different across types of diversity: functional diversity appears to have a positive relationship with success whereas that of demographic diversity is negative., We acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Feder (ECO2016-76998-P, PGC2018-094348-B-I00, PID2021-122403NB-I00), Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2021SGR-00194), ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme, and Severo Ochoa Programme (CEX2019-000915-S).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Goal-oriented agents in a market

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Quérou, Nicolas
We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goal-oriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Agency theory meets matching theory

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a function of the characteristics of all the market participants, as well as the joint attributes of the principal-agent pairs that partner in equilibrium. Moreover, considering each principal-agent relationship as part of a market may strongly influence our assessment of how the characteristics of the principal and the agent affect the optimal incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the matching between principals and agents that we may observe at equilibrium, compared to the matching that would happen if incentive concerns were absent.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Value-free reductions

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sun, Chaoran|||0000-0001-7441-3404
We introduce the value-free (v-f) reductions, operators that map a coalitional game played by a set of players to another "similar" game played by a subset of those players. We propose properties that v-f reductions may satisfy, we provide a theory of duality, and we characterize several v-f reductions (among which the value-free version of the reduced games proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989, and Oishi et al., 2016). Unlike reduced games, introduced to characterize values in terms of consistency, v-f reductions are not defined in reference to values. However, a v-f reduction induces a value. We characterize v-f reductions that induce the Shapley, the stand-alone, and the Banzhaf values. We connect our approach to the theory of implementation. Finally, our new approach is a valuable tool to provide new characterizations of values in terms of consistency. We present new characterizations of the Banzhaf and the stand-alone values.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Organizational structure and technological investment

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Matsushima, Noriaki
  • Shinohara, Ryusuke
We analyze firms' decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game, a solution concept weaker than the core

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda
In the one-sided assignment game, any two agents can form a trade; they can decide to form a partnership and agree on how to share the surplus created. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. Hence the core, which coincides with the set of stable payoffs, may be empty. We introduce the idea of tradewise-stable (t-stable) outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes where all trades are stable; that is, no matched agent can form a blocking pair with any other agent, neither matched nor unmatched. We propose the set of constrained-optimal (optimal) t-stable outcomes, the set of the maximal elements of the set of t-stable outcomes, as a natural solution concept for this game. We prove that this set is non-empty, it coincides with the set of stable outcomes when the core is non-empty, and it satisfies similar properties to the set of stable outcomes even when the core is empty. We propose a partnership formation process that starts withthe outcome where every player stands alone, goes through steps where the set of active players expands, always forming t-stable outcomes, and ends in an (in any) optimal t-stable outcome. Finally, we also use the new concept to establish conditions under which the core is non-empty.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

An axiomatic approach to the law of small numbers

  • Noor, Jawwad
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
With beliefs over the outcomes of coin-tosses as our primitive, we formalize the Law of Small Numbers (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) by an axiom that expresses a belief that the sample mean of any sequence will tend towards the coin's perceived bias along the entire path. The agent is represented by a belief that the bias of the coin is path-dependent and self-correcting. The model is consistent with the evidence used to support the Law of Small Numbers, such as the Gambler's Fallacy. In the setting of Bayesian inference, we show how learning is affected by the interplay between two potentially opposing forces: a belief in the absence of streaks and a belief that the sample mean will tend to the true bias. We show that, unlike other learning results in the literature (Rabin (2002), Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni (2010)), the latter force ensures that the agent at least admits the true parameter as possible in the limit, if not learn with certainty that it is true. In an evolutionary setting, we show that agents who believe in the Law of Small Numbers are never pushed out of the evolutionary race by "standard" agents who correctly understand randomness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Mixture-dependent preference for commitment

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
The literature on temptation and self-control is motivated by evidence of a preference for commitment. This literature has typically put forth models for preferences over menus of lotteries that satisfy the Independence axiom. Independence requires that the ranking of two menus is not affected if each is mixed (probabilistically) with a common third menu. In particular, the preference for commitment is invariant under Independence. We argue that intuitive behavior may require that the preference for commitment be affected by such mixing, and hence be mixture-dependent. To capture such behavior, we generalize Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) by replacing their Independence axiom with a suitably adapted version of the Mixture-Betweenness axiom of Chew (1989)- Dekel (1986). Axiomatizing the model involves a novel extension of the Mixture Space Theorem to preferences that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Does the winner take it all?, redistributive policies and political extremism

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Sas, Willem
The impact of federal policies often depends on fixed regional differences (economic, historical, geographical). Certain regions can therefore be seen as permanently benefiting from the federation and others as losing. We show that this distorts voting behaviour in two ways. First, voters strategically elect federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Second, they suboptimally invest in locally funded goods. This distortion is U-shaped in expected federal benefits. Lastly, we do not observe the usual race to be included in the federal coalition, which would reduce the distortion. We test these predictions on national and European Parliamentary elections since 1990, and find that extreme voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing states distort more than those in the middle. We conclude that federal political structures foment political polarisation, especially when federal decisions require large consensus. Loosening the ties between representatives and their constituency may mitigate this problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Information vs competition, how platform design affects profits and surplus

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Schuett, Florian
We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Two different designs can be observed in the market: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (e.g. Booking) and anonymous platforms that do not (e.g. Hotwire). To analyse the implications of this design choice for profits and surplus, we develop a model in which consumers differ in their location as well as their preferred product variety. Sellers offer their products for sale both directly ('offline') and indirectly via the platform ('online') but are unable to credibly disclose the product variety they offer when selling offline. The model gives rise to a novel trade-off associated with the anonymous platform design: offline, consumers observe location but not variety; online, they observe variety but not location. While the revealing design leads to more informed consumers and better matches, the anonymous design allows sellers to price discriminate and introduces competition between sellers whose markets would otherwise be segmented. We show that the comparison between the designs depends crucially on the relative importance of information about location vis-à-vis information about variety. For an intermediate range, the anonymous design outperforms the revealing design in terms of both profits and welfare.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Updating under imprecise information

  • Lin, Yi-Hsuan
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper models an agent that ranks actions with uncertain payoffs after observing a signal that could have been generated by multiple objective information structures. Under the assumption that the agent's preferences conform to the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), we show that a simple behavioral axiom characterizes a generalization of Bayesian Updating. Our axiom requires that whenever all possible sources of information agree that it is more 'likely' for an action with uncertain payoffs to be better than one with certain payoffs, the agent prefers the former. We also provide axiomatizations for several special cases. Finally, we consider the situation where the informational content of a signal is purely subjective. We characterize the existence of a subjective set of information structures under full Bayesian updating for two extreme cases: (i) No ex-ante state ambiguity, and (ii) No signal ambiguity.