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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

ECO2017-83534-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 23
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incentive contracts and peer effects in the workplace

  • Claveria-Mayol, Marc
  • Milán Solé, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Oviedo-Dávila, Nicolás
We analyze how firms should design wage contracts when workers collaborate in teams and effort costs depend on colleagues through a peer network. Performancebased compensation generates incentives that cascade through the organization, which firms target to boost profits. We analyze optimal incentive design if firms can-and can't-fully discriminate across workers, and when the production technology is separable or complementary across divisions. When workers' effort is substitutable, the most central workers-those who influence most colleagues directly and indirectly-receive the steepest incentives only when output risk is sufficiently large; otherwise firms prioritize workers that are closer to those they influence. We derive a sufficient network statistic that measures the surplus loss when firms must compensate workers of varying centrality equally. Finally, when production technology exhibits complementarity across teams, stronger incentives are assigned to workers who influence colleagues in small teams that receive little influence from others. We apply our findings to organizational design questions, such as optimal firm structure and workforce investments.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identifed by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy- proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satis es the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satis es the increasing intersection property we de ne an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Robust design in monotonic matching markets, a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals this means not being able to provide full service to its patients. A huge literature has advocated the use of stable mechanisms for clearinghouses. The interests among workers and firms are polarized among stable mechanisms, most famously the firm-proposing DA and the worker-proposing DA. We show that for the firmproposing DA ex-ante incentive compatibility and ex-post incentive compatibility are equivalent whereas this is not necessarily true for the worker-proposing DA. The firm-proposing DA turns out to be more robust than the worker-proposing DA under incomplete information when incentives of both sides of the market are important.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Food losses and waste, a needed assessment for future policies

  • Campoy-Muñoz, Pilar|||0000-0003-4163-3907
  • Cardenete Flores, Manuel Alejandro
  • Delgado, María del Carmen|||0000-0002-9343-665X
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
About one third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted. For this reason, food losses and waste has become a key priority within worldwide policy circles. This is a major global issue that not only threatens the viability of a sustainable food system but also generates negative externalities in environmental terms. The avoidance of this forbidding wastage would have a positive economic impact on national economies in terms of resource savings. In this paper we look beyond this somewhat traditional resource savings angle and we shift the focus to explore the distributional consequences of food losses and waste reduction using a resource constrained modeling perspective. The impact due to the behavioral shift of each household is therefore explained by two factors. One is the amount of resources saved when the behavioral shift takes place, whereas the other one has to do with the position of households in the food supply chain. By considering the whole supply chain, instead of the common approach based only in reducing waste by consumers, we enrich the empirical knowledge of this issue and improve the quantification of its economic impact. We examine data for three EU countries that present different economic structures (Germany, Spain and Poland) so as to have a broader and more robust viewpoint of the potential results. We find that distributional effects are different for consumers and producers and also across countries. Our results could be useful for policymakers since they indicate that policies should not be driven merely by the size waste but rather on its position within the food supply chain.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Foundations of pseudomarkets, walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

  • Miralles, Antonio|||0000-0001-8146-2140
  • Pycia, Marek
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

A model of protests, revolution, and information

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries' ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution's success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogeneity of preferences in the population, and the number of contacts. We extend the analysis by examining the effects of homophily on learning: people are more likely to meet others who have similar preferences, undercutting learning. We introduce variants of our model to discuss other ways of learning about the support for a revolution. We discuss why holding mass protests before a revolt provides more informative signals of people's willingness to actively participate than other less costly forms of communication (e.g., via social media). We also show how outcomes of revolutions in one region can inform citizens of another region and thus trigger (or discourage) neighboring revolutions. We also discuss the role of governments in avoiding revolutions and learning about their citizens' concerns; in particular, by observing the strength of protests and counter-protests.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Deciding on what to decide

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Pairwise justifiable changes in collective choices

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
Consider the following principle regarding the performance of collective choice rules. "If a rule selects alternative x in situation 1, and alternative y in situation 2, there must be an alternative z, and some member of society whose appreciation of z relative to x has increased when going from situation 1 to situation 2." This principle requires a minimal justification for the fall of x in the consideration of society: someone must have decreased its appreciation relative to some other possible alternative. On appropriately restricted domains, pairwise justifiability, along with anonymity and neutrality, characterizes Condorcet consistent rules, thus providing a foundation for the choice of the alternatives that win by majority over all others in pairwise comparisons, when they exist. We study the consequences of imposing this requirement of pairwise justifiability on a large class of collective choice rules that includes social choice and social welfare functions as particular cases. When preference profiles are unrestricted, it implies dictatorship, and both Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems become corollaries of our general result.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Opinion aggregation, borda and condorcet revisited

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
In a world admitting a fixed finite set of alternatives, an opinion is an ordered pair of alternatives. Such a pair expresses the idea that one alternative is superior to another in some sense, and an opinion aggregator assigns an aggregate relation on the set of alternatives to every possible state of opinion. Our primary motivation is to extend the standard model of social choice theory to a more general one in which no specific reference to agents generating or holding opinions is needed. Although our analysis has some bearing on those cases where opinions reflect the goodness relations of agents in a society, it is not limited to them. In addition to that interpretation, opinions can also be used to represent other forms of comparative assessments emerging from different sources. The main results of the paper provide characterizations of suitably formulated versions of the Borda rule and Condorcet's majority rule, essential aggregation methods that remain well-defined in our larger context.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Order-k rationality

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • de Clippel, Geoffroy
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Rozen, Kareen
A decision maker (DM) may not perfectly maximize her preference over the feasible set. She may feel it is good enough to maximize her preference over a sufficiently large consideration set; or just require that her choice is sufficiently well-ranked (e.g., in the top quintile of options); or even endogenously determine a threshold for what is good enough, based on an initial sampling of the options. Heuristics such as these are all encompassed by a common theory of order-k rationality, which relaxes perfect optimization by only requiring choices from a set S to fall within the set's top k(S) elements according to the DM's preference ordering. Heuristics aside, this departure from rationality offers a natural way, in the classic 'as if' tradition, to gradually accommodate more choice patterns as k increases. We characterize the empirical content of order-k rationality (and related theories), and provide a tractable testing method which is comparable to the method of checking SARP
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incentive contracts and peer effects in the workplace

  • Milán Solé, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Oviedo-Dávila, Nicolás
Risk-averse workers in a team exert effort to produce joint output. Workers' incentives are connected via chains of productivity spillovers, represented by a network of peer-effects. We study the problem of a principal offering wage contracts that simultaneously incentivize and insure agents. We solve for the optimal linear contract for any network and show that optimal incentives are loaded more heavily on workers that are more central in a specific way. We conveniently link firm profits to network structure via the networks spectral properties. When firms can't personalize contracts, better connected workers ex- tract rents. In this case, a group composition result follows: large within-group differences in centrality can decrease firm's profits. Finally, we find that modular production has important implications for how peer structures distribute incentives.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The limits to local insurance

  • Milán Solé, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Gierlinger, Johannes|||0000-0002-9615-4076
We study decentralized insurance when multiple risks are payoff-relevant, but each agent may only trade a (possibly different) subset of risks. Unless (at least) one agent can trade every risk, insurance markets remain incomplete, and the economy is not resilient to worst-case events. We also identify spill overs in any feasible allocation: others' inability to trade some risks restricts an agent's resilience to joint realizations. Unless an agent can trade a superset of i's risks, agent i is not resilient to them. In an application, we model constraints as risk-sharing networks and measure resilience in a Malawian village.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Simple market structures are incomplete

  • Milán, Pau.|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Gierlinger, Johannes|||0000-0002-9615-4076
We study how risk is shared using simple assets, each of which pays on a specific subset of payoff-relevant variables. We show that a market composed of simple assets is incomplete - no matter how many or which assets exist- because it can never address the joint realizations of some distinct risks. We also show that this inability to refine trades generates spill overs between agents with different types of financial constraints. Agents of type i are exposed to uninsurable income risk unless there exists another type j who can condition on all variables affecting i's income.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An Armington-Leontief model

  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
We develop a novel linear equilibrium model with an Armington flavor. We provide (1) proof of the solvability of the model and of the existence and non-negativity of the equilibrium solution and of the newly derived multiplier matrix; we also show (2) that the standard Leontief multiplier matrix arises as a special case of this new model and (3) that this model allows the computation of multiplier effects with no external output bias, which is particularly relevant for applied economic analysis.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods economy

  • Chatterji, Shurojit
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.