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INSTITUCIONES, INCENTIVOS Y COMPORTAMIENTO EN SALUD, INNOVACION Y FORMACION

ECO2012-31962

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2012
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 17
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Colaboración público-privada en sanidad

  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
Los acuerdos de colaboración público-privada en el sector de la sanidad se utilizan en todo el mundo como un mecanismo para mejorar la provisión y la calidad de los servicios de salud. Estos acuerdos, si están adecuadamente gestionados, aportan beneficios al sector público en términos de reducción de costes y de riesgos en proyectos de provisión de servicios de salud; para el sector privado representan oportunidades de negocio; y para los ciudadanos represantan el acceso a más y mejores servicios sin que ello implique mayor presión fiscal.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Technological adoption in health care - The role of payment systems

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
This paper examines the incentive to adopt a new technology resulting from common payment systems, namely mixed cost reimbursement and DRG reimbursement. Adoption is based on a cost-benefit criterion. We find that retrospective payment systems require a large enough patient benefit to yield adoption, while under DRG-linked payment, adoption may arise in the absence of patients benefits when the differential reimbursement for the old vs new technology is large enough. Also, mixed cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption under conditions on the differential reimbursement levels and patient benefits. In policy terms, mixed cost reimbursement system may be more effective than a DRG payment system to induce technology adoption. Our analysis also shows that current economic evaluation criteria for new technologies do not capture the different ways payment systems influence technology adoption. This gives a new dimension to the discussion of prospective vs retrospective payment systems of the last decades centered on the debate of quality vs cost containment.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Private versus social incentives for pharmaceutical innovation

  • González, Paula|||0000-0003-1630-9726
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We provide a theoretical framework to contribute to the current debate regarding the tendency of pharmaceutical companies to direct their R&D toward marketing products that are follow-on drugs of already existing drugs, rather than toward the development of breakthrough drugs. We construct a model with a population of patients who can be treated with drugs that are horizontally and vertically differentiated. In addition to a pioneering drug, a new drug can be marketed as the result of an innovative process. We analyze physician prescription choices and the optimal pricing decision of an innovative firm. We also characterize the incentives of the innovative firm to conduct R&D activities, disentangling the quest for breakthrough drugs from the firm effort to develop follow-on drugs. Our results offer theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical firms devote too many resources to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Endogenous matching in university-industry collaboration, theory and empirical evidence from the UK

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We use a two-sided matching framework to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We consider both horizontal and vertical characteristics-those related to affinity (e.g., preferences for a type of scientific research) and those related to ability (e.g., capacity to produce high-quality scientific output). We build a unique data set based on the teams of academics and firms that proposed research projects to the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. Our results are suggestive of positive assortative matching in terms of ability and type, while the matching is negative assortative in terms of their interactions. The most able and the most applied academics are the ones that are more likely to propose collaborative as opposed to noncollaborative projects.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

  • Diamantoudi, Effrosyni
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Xue, Licun
We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues. Examples of such games are several Örms competing in multiple markets, and countries negotiating both a trade agreement (through, e.g., WTO) and an environmental agreement (e.g., Kyoto Protocol). We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values for partition function games to issue-externality games. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment. The solution concept that we propose can be applied to many interesting games, including intertemporal situations where players meet sequentially.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Wettstein, David
We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings, where these conditions are satisfied.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461-479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873-888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" that implies and generalizes two "folk theorems" for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Copyright licensing under asymmetric information

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
In this paper we aim to contribute to the discussion on the role of royalties in copyright agreements by concentrating on the incentives that they provide to the creator and the intermediary when the success of the work depends on their involvement with the commercialization process. We also consider the effect of this moral hazard on the matching among creators and intermediaries and their gains.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the joint production of research and training

  • Freitas, Antonio
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
Universities and research institutions have the responsibility to produce science and to provide training to new generations of researchers. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the determinants of a senior scientist's decisions about allocating time between these tasks. The results of this decision depend upon the characteristics of the research project, the senior scientist's concern for training and the expected innate ability of the junior scientist involved. We analyze the role that a regulator can play in defining both the value of scientific projects and the future population of independent scientists.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Schroyen, Fred
We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion, and solve for the profit-maximising menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the market. Our findings are threefold. First, it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Second, if heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently high, then some high-risk individuals (the risk-tolerant ones) will obtain lower coverage than some low-risk individuals (the risk-averse ones). Third, because women tend to be more risk averse than men (in that the risk aversion distribution for women first-order stochastically dominates that for men), gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets

  • McFadden, Daniel
  • Noton, Carlos
  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks, all at positive profits. Hence individuals, regardless of their type, "subsidize" insurers. If the legislation is sufficiently stringent the equilibrium is pooling, all insurers just break even and low risks subsidize high risks. None of these results require resorting to non-Nash equilibrium notions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games, What do dictators believe other dictators do?

  • Iriberri, Nagore
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro|||0000-0002-1606-2631
Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable. © 2013 Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The role of platform quality and publicly owned platforms in the free-to-air broadcasting industry

  • González Maestre, Miguel
  • Martínez Sánchez, Francisco
In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equilibrium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is drastically different in each scenario. We also consider the welfare implications of our analysis and generate policy implications regarding the optimal level of government intervention in the broadcasting industry.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

  • Guo, Bing
  • Lou, Yun
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.
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Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

El coste del cáncer en España, ¿qué podemos esperar de los medicamentos biosimilares?

  • Diego del Río, Laura
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro|||0000-0002-1606-2631
Uno de cada tres españoles será diagnosticado de cáncer en algún momento de su vida, enfermedad que en la actualidad ya es la primera causa de mortalidad entre los hombres y la segunda entre las mujeres. Además de un importante problema de salud pública, el cáncer implica altos costes económicos tanto para los pacientes como para el sistema sanitario. Se estima que en el año 2009 la carga económica del cáncer supuso en España unos 9.000 millones de euros (Luengo-Fernández R. et al., 2013). A pesar de que la mortalidad por esta enfermedad se ha estabilizado o incluso ha disminuido en determinados tipos de tumores, el envejecimiento de la población ha provocado un aumento del número de nuevos casos. Además, la aplicación de programas de cribado y las mejoras en el diagnóstico y tratamiento han incrementado significativamente la supervivencia, aumentando el número de pacientes candidatos a ser tratados. Por otra parte, la introducción en el mercado de nuevos tratamientos y el aumento en espiral de sus precios, más en el actual contexto de crisis económica, está provocando un creciente problema en los servicios sanitarios de todo el mundo, que nos debe hacer reflexionar sobre la viabilidad del sistema actual y su sostenibilidad. Este debate exige explorar estrategias que permitan reducir los costes sanitarios sin comprometer la eficacia de los tratamientos y la seguridad de los pacientes. Especialmente porque, en breve, varios de los medicamentos biotecnológicos utilizados en oncología, con un gran impacto sobre los presupuestos, perderán su patente en Europa y se abrirán las puertas a la comercialización de medicamentos biosimilares. Su introducción implicará nuevos retos para gestores y clínicos, pero también proporcionará la oportunidad de establecer una cierta competencia en el mercado, con un previsible impacto positivo sobre los presupuestos sanitarios. Este capítulo revisa la carga y el coste del cáncer en España, con especial atención al tratamiento farmacológico. En particular, se exploran los motivos que llevan a los altos costes de los medicamentos oncológicos, su impacto en los presupuestos así como los retos y oportunidades que la introducción de los medicamentos biosimilares tendrán previsiblemente sobre el coste del tratamiento oncológico.