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POLITICAS DE SALUD Y BIENESTAR: INCENTIVOS Y REGULACION

ECO2008-04321

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2008
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD PABLO DE OLAVIDE, DE SEVILLA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Enrolling the self-employed in mandatory health insurance in Colombia: are we missing other factors?

  • Arrieta, Alejandro
  • García Prado, Ariadna
  • Panopoulou, Giota
We assess the impact that Colombia’s 1993 health sector reform had on the enrollment of self-employed workers in mandatory social health insurance scheme, with a especial focus on the independent contractors. This group grew dramatically in the form of workers cooperatives between 1993 and 2003, becoming a source of self-employed evasion and a way to disguised employment. We use two national-level Living Standards Measurement Surveys conducted in Colombia in 1997 and 2003, and follow a methodology that corrects for sample selection, decomposing health insurance coverage variation into changes attributed to the reform and to the characteristics of independent contractors. We find that: (i) Between 1997 and 2003, enrollment increased in 28 percentage points reaching an insurance rate of 62%, still below the reform goal of 80%, (ii) enrollment of independent contractors in 1997 was only 35% (compared to 50%) after adjusting by the selection bias due to disguised employment, (ii) the new legislation and stringent monitoring implemented in 2003 to cope with evasion seem to be effective since the sample selection due to disguised employment was not statistically significant in 2003. Addressing the interaction of the labor market with the health reform, as well as, accounting for the heterogeneity within the self-employed group are the main contributions of this paper to the literature on health insurance reforms in developing countries., Ariadna García Prado acknowledges support from the project ECO2008-04321/ECON of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Codes of best practices in competitive markets for managers

  • Alonso-Paulí, Eduard
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We study the corporate governance of firms in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for better management control, but makes it hard for managers to react quickly when market conditions change. Codes tend to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in environments where managers obtain low levels of benefits. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt a Code when managers are not too heterogeneous, while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce hiring the best managers; instead, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A theoretical approach to dual practice regulations in the health sector

  • González, Paula|||0000-0003-1630-9726
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We focus on three interventions: banning dual practice, offering rewarding contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice (including both limits to private earnings of dual providers and limits to involvement in private activities). An ancillary objective of the paper is to investigate whether regulations that are optimal for developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. Our results offer theoretical support for the desirability of different regulations in different economic environments.