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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Academic integrity in on-line exams: evidence from a randomized field experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study academic integrity in a final exam of a compulsory course with almost 500 undergraduate students at a major Spanish university. Confinement and university closure due to Covid-19 took place by the end of the last lecture week. As a consequence, the usual classroom exam was turned into an unproctored on-line multiple-choice exam without backtracking. We exploit the different orders of exam problems and detailed data with timestamps to study students’ academic integrity. First, taking the average over questions that were part of both earlier and later “rounds”, we find that the number of correct answers to questions in the later round was 7.7% higher than in the earlier round. Second, the average completion time of questions in the later round was 18.1% shorter than in the earlier round. Third, a mere reminder of the university’s code of ethics, which was sent to a subgroup halfway through the exam, did not affect cheating levels., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), Spain through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/ AEI, Spain/10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, Spain (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: Equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis

  • Braat, Jac
  • Hamers, Herbert
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Slikker, Marco
For single decision maker optimization problems that lack time efficient algorithms to determine the optimum, there is a need for heuristics. In the context of coordinated production planning, the seminal paper of Graham (1969) provided a performance analysis of heuristics and obtained a bound in relation to the centralized optimum. This paper introduces a framework that includes a performance analysis of a so-called equilibrium heuristic in the setting of multiple decision maker problems. The framework consists of three steps: a heuristic for each player that leads to a strategy profile, the verification that this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, and finally a worst case cost analysis to obtain a bound on the performance of the heuristic in terms of the aggregate cost in the obtained Nash equilibrium in relation to the centralized optimum. We implement our general framework in a setting of sequencing situations with selfish agents, multiple identical machines, and the sum of completion times as cost criterion. We provide a tight upper bound for the performance of our equilibrium heuristic. Simulations show that the equilibrium heuristic generally performs much better than the derived tight upper bound. Finally, the relation with the price of anarchy is discussed., He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Tilburg University and an extramural fellowship from CentER. He also gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359), Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2017-88130-P AEI/FEDER, UE), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Deliberative structures and their impact on voting behavior under social conflict

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
Trabajo presentado en el European Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (EWEBE), organizado por la Universidad de Bologna los días 26 y 27 de mayo de 2017 con el título: The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavio.--Trabajo presentado en los Bilkent Microeconomics Seminars organizados por la Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey) el día 29 de noviembre de 2017, Inequalities in democracies are multi-faceted. They not only incorporate differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information and social influence. In a lab experiment, we study the interaction of these inequalities to provide a better understanding of socio-political tensions in modern societies. We identify the tragedy of the elite, the dilemma that privileged access to information about a fundamental state that mediates political conflict creates lying incentives for the better informed. In our experiment, an electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the world. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. We study four different communication protocols which vary the access to communication channels of the two groups and are meant to represent societies with different degrees of openness. We hypothesize that the deliberative structures affect group identities, preferences, and voting. Our observed outcomes largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair as well as from the Graduate School of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Universit¨at Hamburg., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Distributional Concerns in Managers’ Compensation Schemes for Heterogeneous Workers: Experimental Evidence

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Ortiz, José M.
  • Solà, Carles
We present results from three-player experiments aimed at studying distributional concerns in how owner-managers compensate themselves and workers of different productivities and effort costs, as well as their relations to various equity principles. We are also interested in how owner-managers decisions’ are affected by pay secrecy. We use a game in which workers first exert effort and owner-managers then decide on bonuses for themselves and workers. Our design includes four treatments: (1) different productivities of workers with complete information; (2) different productivities of workers with pay secrecy among workers; (3) different effort cost of workers with complete information; and (4) different effort cost of workers with pay secrecy among workers. The equity principles we focus on are ‘production-equity’, higher production leads to higher wage, and ‘effort-cost equity’, higher effort-cost leads to higher wage. Across all treatments about 50% of all manager choices are compatible both with ‘production equity’ and with ‘effort- cost equity’, about 20% only with production equity and about 15% only with effort-cost equity. Overall, the effect of effort-cost equity is significantly stronger than that of production-equity. Pay secrecy does not significantly affect compensation differences among workers., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2017-88130), the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136).and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair, Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers

  • Hamers, Herbert
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Slikker, Marco
This paper deals with decentralized decision-making situations in which firms outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. Each firm aims to minimize the sum of its completion times. We study whether a central authority can install a mechanism such that strategic interaction leads to a socially optimal schedule. For the case of single demand the shortest-first mechanism implements optimal schedules in Nash equilibrium. We show that for the general case there exists no anonymous mechanism that implements optimal schedules in correlated equilibrium., Financial support from from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) is also gratefully acknowledged.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). She gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under project reference no. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4546/2014. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project ECO2015-65701-P.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

  • Jaramillo, Paula
  • Kayi, Çagatay
  • Klijn, Flip
This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study rank-fairness within pairs of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight., The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Are there gender differences in status-ranking aversion?

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gërxhani, Klarita
  • Schram, Arthur
Competition involves two dimensions, rivalry for resources and social-status ranking. In our experiment we exclude the first dimension and investigate gender differences in the preference for status ranking. Participants perform a task under non-rivalry incentives. Before doing so, individuals indicate whether they prefer to do the task in an environment with social-status ranking or one without, knowing whether or not the choice will be imposed upon the whole group (as opposed to being personal) and whether the ranking will be observed by a man or a woman. We find no gender difference in mean status-ranking aversion when the ranking is personal. When the ranking is imposed, there are still no gender differences in the preferences for social ranking when the rank observer is a woman, and women are not affected by the rank observer's gender. With a male rank observer, however, men have a much stronger desire to be ranked than with a female rank observer., We thank the EUI (Grant IP53), the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through (Grant: ECO2017-88130) and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) for financial support.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle., Financial support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2017-SGR-1359), Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, Spain (ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, Spain (SEV-2015-0563). Financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal under project reference no. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4546/2014. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, Spain (PGC2018-096977-B-I00).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Advice from women and men and selection into competition

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Rott, Christina
Advice processes are omnipresent in our professional and private lives. We use a laboratory experiment to study how gender and gender matching affect advice giving and how gender matching affects advice following about entry into a real-effort tournament. For advice giving we find that women are less likely than men to recommend tournament entry to advisees than are intermediate performers. Furthermore, women maximize less often the expected earnings of advisees than intermediate performers. For advice following we find that men enter the tournament significantly more often than women in the intermediate-performance group do. Gender matching does not seem to affect advice giving or following. Overall, when it is less clear what the better advice or decision is, gender differences emerge. These results are consistent with findings in other areas that document that gender differences emerge in situations that are more ambiguous., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2017-88130), the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Watching or not watching? Access to information and the incentive effects of firing threats

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Corgnet, Brice
  • Hernán-González, Roberto
  • Ortiz, José M.
  • Solà, Carles
A common rationale for the use of salary contracts is that they can produce substantial incentive effects when coupled with firing threats. However, enforcing firing threats may require close supervision of employees, thus possibly offsetting the very reasons salaries are commonly used, such as lowering monitoring costs and granting autonomy to employees. We design a series of experiments to study the effectiveness of firing threats when only limited information is available to supervisors. We show that light and unobtrusive supervision can produce large incentive effects. Compared to salary contracts, firing threats based on observing organizational performance alone increase employees’ output by 70% whereas only observing how long an employee works doubles output. These findings show that salaries can produce large incentive effects even in the absence of intensive supervision. Finally, we show that salary contracts with firing threats perform at least as well as other popular incentive schemes, such as bonuses, individual and team incentives, that rely on a similar amount of information about employees., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017–88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019–000915-S), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equal and unequal profit sharing in highly interdependent work groups: A laboratory experiment

  • Angelovski, Andrej
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Solà, Carles
We study the performance effects of two profit sharing schemes in a simplified representation of an organization with high task interdependence. The production process involves three stages such that output of earlier stages is the necessary input for subsequent stages. Work at earlier stages is easier than at later stages and the product is only final if it goes successfully through the highest stage. We compare the effects on the performance of the organization of a payment scheme in which profits are equally shared by all those involved in the production process with one where the participation in profits is strongly increasing in the production stage. The comparison is made for two ways of assigning individuals to the production stage: randomly or by merit. We also study the distinction between sharing schemes that are exogenously imposed and those that are chosen by the person at the top of the hierarchy. We find that overall the type of payment scheme has no effect on profits. We also find that profits increase over time and more so with the equal than with the unequal sharing scheme. The high interdependence in production that we study makes steep incentives ineffective and even counter-productive. These changes in profits over time can be explained by changes in production performance over time. We also find that merit-based assignment to positions in the hierarchy leads to significantly higher profits than random assignment., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

  • Jaramillo, Paula
  • Kayi, Çagatay
  • Klijn, Flip
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the corresponding order of pairs, at each step a rank-priority mechanism considers a rank-priority pair and matches an available student to an unfilled school if the student and the school rank and prioritize each other in accordance with the rank-priority pair. The Boston or immediate acceptance mechanism is a particular rank-priority mechanism. Our first main result is a characterization of the subfamily of rank-priority mechanisms that Nash implement the set of stable matchings (Theorem 1). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete information, no rank-priority mechanism implements the set of stable matchings (Theorem 2)., The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Vice-Presidency for Research and the Faculty of Economics of Universidad de Los Andes and the hospitality of Quantil during Fall 2019. The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P AEI/FEDER, UE, and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Walzl, Markus
  • Kah, Christopher
This paper studies the one-to-one two-sided marriage model (Gale and Shapley 1962). If agents’ preferences exhibit mutually best (i.e., each agent is most preferred by her/his most preferred matching partner), there is a unique stable matching without rank gaps (i.e., in each matched pair the agents assign one another the same rank). We study in how far this result is robust for matching markets that are “close” to mutually best. Without a restriction on preference profiles, we find that natural “distances” to mutually best neither bound the size of the core nor the rank gaps at stable matchings. However, for matching markets that satisfy horizontal heterogeneity, “local” distances to mutually best provide bounds for the size of the core and the rank gaps at stable matchings., The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was LFUI guest professor at Innsbruck University. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Innsbruck University and support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359), Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563 and CEX2019-000915-S). C. Kah and M. Walzl thank the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF) for support through project P-28632-G27 and SFB63.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Inequality and Happiness

  • Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada
  • Ramos, Xavier
The happiness literature empirically shows that individuals are happier not necessarily if they live in a country with high economic growth, but most important if they live in cohesive societies, with more equality (not only in terms of income), less poverty, higher social capital, and jobs for everybody. This chapter relates to this literature and examines the link between inequality and happiness or life satisfaction. Section “Inequality and Happiness” presents a literature review on the correlation between inequality and happiness. In the review, special attention is given to the mechanisms that explain preferences for equality. Although the income inequality literature has emphasized the distinction between objective inequality (e.g., measured with the Gini) and perceived inequality, the happiness literature has not considered this distinction. Nevertheless, one would expect individuals to show a stronger correlation between perceived, rather than with objective, inequality and well-being, preferences, and behavior. Section “Inequality and Happiness” briefly discusses this. Section “Happiness Inequality” describes first the incipient literature on happiness or life satisfaction inequality trends, which is mostly descriptive. While policy makers and researchers have focused on income (and, to a lesser extent, health) inequality, the distribution of happiness has been largely ignored. Nevertheless, happiness distribution is a relevant measure of welfare and should be on the agenda of policy makers. In this literature, happiness inequality is typically measured with the standard deviation, an inequality index thought for cardinal variables. A priory this is an important shortcoming as happiness is measured as an ordinal discrete variable. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to analyze the impact of measuring happiness inequality by means of indices designed for ordinal measures. This chapter contributes to the happiness literature by presenting the first empirical study that, using data on 56 countries, measures happiness inequality with 20 different indices designed for ordinal data and compares them with the standard deviation by means of rank correlations., Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant through project grant ECO2017-88130-P and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through project grant SGR2017-1359. Xavier Ramos gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant through project grant PID2019-104619RB-C43 and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through project grant SGR2017-1571., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Academic integrity in on-line exams: Evidence from a randomized field experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study academic integrity in a final exam of a compulsory course with almost 500 undergraduate students at a major Spanish university. Confinement and university closure due to Covid-19 took place by the end of the last lecture week. As a consequence, the usual classroom exam was turned into an unproctored on-line multiple-choice exam without backtracking. We exploit the different orders of exam problems and detailed data with timestamps to study students’ academic integrity. First, taking the average over questions that were part of both earlier and later “rounds”, we find that the number of correct answers to questions in the later round was 7.7% higher than in the earlier round. Second, the average completion time of questions in the later round was 18.1% shorter than in the earlier round. Third, a mere reminder of the university’s code of ethics, which was sent to a subgroup halfway through the exam, did not affect cheating levels., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), Spain through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/ AEI, Spain/10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, Spain (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S)He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant PID2021-122919-NB-I00., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market

  • Biró, Péter
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pápai, Szilvia
We study generalized Shapley-Scarf exchange markets where each agent is endowed with multiple units of an indivisible and agent-specific good and monetary compensations are not possible. An outcome is given by a circulation which consists of a balanced exchange of goods. We focus on circulation rules that only require as input ordinal preference rankings of individual goods, and agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over bundles of goods. We study the properties of serial dictatorship rules which allow agents to choose either a single good or an entire bundle sequentially, according to a fixed ordering of the agents. We also introduce and explore extensions of these serial dictatorship rules that ensure individual rationality. The paper analyzes the normative and incentive properties of these four families of serial dictatorships and also shows that the individually rational extensions can be implemented with efficient graph algorithms., PBiró gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Momentum Grant No. LP2021-2, and by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, OTKA, Grant No. K143858. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics, SEV-2015-0563 and CEX2019-000915-S). S. Pápai gratefully acknowledges financial support from an FRQSC grant titled “Formation des coalitions et des réseaux dans les situations économiques et sociales avec des externalités” (SE-144698)
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis

  • Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Vorsatz, Marc
The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’ preferences and the priorities children have for different schools. The related experimental literature analyzes in detail how various mechanisms fare in terms of welfare and stability of the resulting matchings, yet often provides only aggregate statistics of the individual behavior that leads to these outcomes (i.e., the degree to which subjects tell the truth in the induced simultaneous move game). In this paper, we show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) adequately describes individual behavior and the resulting matching in three constrained problems for which the immediate acceptance mechanism and the student-optimal stable mechanism coincide. Specifically, the comparative statics of the logit-QRE with risk-neutral and expected-payoff-maximizing agents capture the directional changes of subject behavior and the prevalence of the different stable matchings when cardinal payoffs (i.e., relative preference intensities) are modified in the experiment., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces. J. Alcalde-Unzu gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (PGC2018-093542-B-I00 and PID2021-127119NB-I00). F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359 and 2021-SGR-00416) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). M. Vorsatz gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (PGC2018-096977-B-I00 and PID2021-122919NB-I00)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Competition and Gender Inequality: A Comprehensive Analysis of Effects and Mechanisms

  • Gërxhani, Klarita
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Schram, Arthur
This study uses data from a series of laboratory experiments to provide a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in performance caused by two different dimensions of competition—rivalry for resources and status ranking. It also examines two mechanisms behind such differences. The results indicate that in the absence of any competitive dimension the performance difference between men and women is not statistically significant at the usual levels. Any competitive dimension, however, leads to women performing statistically significantly worse than men. These results are explained by the two mechanisms: (1) men’s beliefs that they are better than women under competition and (2) women’s adherence to a prescribed stereotype of not harming others. This suggests that gender differences under competition are endogenous to situational contexts., We thank the EUI (Grant IP53), the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness throughGrant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D(CEX2019-000915-S), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136), and the ResearchPriority Area Behavioral Economics of the University of Amsterdam for financial support. Wethank Arnout van de Rijt, Robb Willer, and Ezra Zuckerman, for helpful suggestions at variousstages of this project., Peer reviewed
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Academic integrity in on-line exams: evidence from a randomized field experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study academic integrity in a final exam of a compulsory course with almost 500 undergraduate students at a major Spanish university. Confinement and university closure due to Covid-19 took place by the end of the last lecture week. As a consequence, the usual classroom exam was turned into an unproctored on-line multiple-choice exam without backtracking. We exploit the different orders of exam problems and detailed data with timestamps to study students’ academic integrity. First, taking the average over questions that were part of both earlier and later “rounds”, we find that the number of correct answers to questions in the later round was 7.7% higher than in the earlier round. Second, the average completion time of questions in the later round was 18.1% shorter than in the earlier round. Third, a mere reminder of the university’s code of ethics, which was sent to a subgroup halfway through the exam, did not affect cheating levels., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), Spain through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/ AEI, Spain/10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, Spain (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Vorsatz, Marc
The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’ preferences and the priorities children have for different schools. The related experimental literature analyzes in detail how various mechanisms fare in terms of welfare and stability of the resulting matchings, yet often provides only aggregate statistics of the individual behavior that leads to these outcomes (i.e., the degree to which subjects tell the truth in the induced simultaneous move game). In this paper, we show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) adequately describes individual behavior and the resulting matching in three constrained problems for which the immediate acceptance mechanism and the student-optimal stable mechanism coincide. Specifically, the comparative statics of the logit-QRE with risk-neutral and expected-payoff-maximizing agents capture the directional changes of subject behavior and the prevalence of the different stable matchings when cardinal payoffs (i.e., relative preference intensities) are modified in the experiment., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces. J. Alcalde-Unzu gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (PGC2018-093542-B-I00 and PID2021-127119NB-I00). F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359 and 2021-SGR-00416) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). M. Vorsatz gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (PGC2018-096977-B-I00 and PID2021-122919NB-I00).