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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voluntary contributions “vote out” public ones

  • Calveras, Aleix
  • Ganuza, Juan-José
  • Llobet, Gerard
Many public goods are supported with both private and public funding. It is often argued that public funding, based on taxes, crowds out private philanthropic contributions. Agents respond to increases in taxes by decreasing their donations. The tax level, however, is not exogenous and it depends on the political equilibrium arising from agents’ voting decisions. In this paper we analyze a variety of motivations for voluntary donations and show that when philanthropic preferences become more prevalent in the society, the equilibrium tax level will tend to be lower and, more surprisingly, the stock of the public good may decrease., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology is gratefully acknowledged through the project ECO2010-21393-C04-02 and SEJ2006-09993 for the first and second author, respectively, and the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 Project “Consolidating Economics” for the last two authors.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voluntary contributions “vote out” public ones

  • Calveras, Aleix
  • Ganuza, Juan-José
  • Llobet, Gerard
Many public goods are supported with both private and public funding. It is often argued that public funding, based on taxes, crowds out private philanthropic contributions. Agents respond to increases in taxes by decreasing their donations. The tax level, however, is not exogenous and it depends on the political equilibrium arising from agents’ voting decisions. In this paper we analyze a variety of motivations for voluntary donations and show that when philanthropic preferences become more prevalent in the society, the equilibrium tax level will tend to be lower and, more surprisingly, the stock of the public good may decrease., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology is gratefully acknowledged through the project ECO2010-21393-C04-02 and SEJ2006-09993 for the first and second author, respectively, and the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 Project “Consolidating Economics” for the last two authors.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Regime change in large information networks

  • Milán, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • de Martí, Joan
We study global games of regime change within networks of truthful communication. Agents can choose between attacking and not attacking a status quo, whose strength is unknown. Players share private signals on this state of the world with their immediate neighbors. Communication with neighboring players introduces local correlations in posterior beliefs and also allows for the pooling of information. In order to isolate the latter effect, we provide, as a methodological contribution, sparseness conditions on networks that allow for asymptotic approximations that eliminate covariances from equilibrium strategies. We ask how changes in the distribution of connectivities in the population affect the types of coordination in equilibrium as well as the likelihood of successful rally. We find that without a public signal strategic incentives align, and the probability of success remains independent of the type of network. With a public signal the distribution of degrees unambiguously affects the probability of success, although the direction of change is not monotone, and depends crucially on the cost of attack.