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FUNDAMENTOS Y PRACTICA DEL DISEÑO DE MECANISMOS: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

ECO2014-53051-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Comparing Voting by Committees According to their Manipulability

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Les aportacions de John F. Nash a l'economia, equilibri i negociació

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
John F. Nash va rebre el Premi Nobel d'Economia l'any 1994, juntament amb John C. Harsanyi i Reinhard Selten, «per les seves anàlisis de l'equilibri en la teoria dels jocs no cooperatius», i el Premi Abel de Matemàtiques l'any 2015, juntament amb Louis Nirenberg, «per les seves contribucions notables i fonamentals a la teoria d'equacions en derivades parcials no lineals i les seves aplicacions a l'anàlisi geomètrica». Aquest article presenta les dues contribucions més importants de Nash a l'economia: l'equilibri de Nash d'un joc no cooperatiu i la solució de Nash al problema de la negociació.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions

  • Hafalir, Isa
  • Miralles Asensio, Antonio|||0000-0001-8146-2140
We allocate agents to three kinds of hierarchical positions: top, medium, and low. No monetary transfers are allowed. We solve for the incentive-compatible (IC) mechanisms that maximize a family of weighted social welfares that includes utilitarian and Rawlsian welfares. When the market is tough (all agents bear positive risk of obtaining a low position in any IC and feasible mechanism), then the pseudomarket mechanism with equal budgets (PM) and the Boston mechanism without priorities (BM) yield identical assignments which are always optimal. Otherwise, when the market is mild, PM and BM di¤er and each one implements the optimal rule under di¤erent assumptions on the curvature of virtual valuations. We also establish that both BM and PM mechanisms guarantee IC Pareto-optimal assignments for a domain of preference distributions satisfying weak assumptions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Maturity and school outcomes in an inflexible system, evidence from Catalonia

  • Calsamiglia, Caterina|||0000-0003-2079-7179
  • Loviglio, Annalisa|||0000-0002-6078-7234
The existence of a rigid cutoff date which determines when children start primary school creates a large heterogeneity in students' level of maturity within the classroom. We use rich administrative data of the universe of public schools in Catalonia to show that: (1) relatively younger children do significantly worse both in tests administered at the school level and at the regional level, and they experience greater retention. (2) These effects are homogeneous across SES and significant across the whole distribution of performance. (3) Younger children in our data exhibit higher dropout rates and choose the academic track in secondary school less often. (4) Younger children are more frequently diagnosed with learning disorders.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Ordinal relative satisficing behavior, theory and experiments

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Neme, Alejandro
We propose a notion of r-rationality, a relative version of satisficing behavior based on the idea that, for any set of available alternatives, individuals choose one of their r-best according to a single preference. We fully characterize the choice functions satisfying the condition for any r, and provide an algorithm to compute the maximal degree of r-rationality associated with any given choice function. The notion is extended to individuals whose r may vary with the set of available alternatives. We provide experimental evidence that the predictive power of our theory, measured by Seltenís index, improves upon that of alternative ones.