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Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Group strategy-proofness in private good economies
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82).
Proyecto:
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2011-0075
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