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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Liberté, Égalité, ... Religiosité

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
In this paper we study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and over the legal restrictions on personal liberties. Religious teachings generally restrict individual behavior on issues such as consumption of some goods, sexual orientation, divorce, abortion, gay marriage, contraception and so on. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality experienced when others in society practice those liberties beyond what he deems adequate. The first assumption implies that, when the law allows for the use of liberties, secular individuals have a higher incentive to work than religious ones. As a result, the political choice of legal restrictions on liberties has an impact on income inequality. The second implies that religious individuals may prefer to repress liberties in society. As repression of liberties reduces income inequality, poor religious individuals may still prefer low taxes compared with richer and less religious ones. We also analyze the choice of redistribution and the legal cap on liberties as the majoritarian outcome in a citizen-candidate model. We obtain that when the majority of the population is religious and the religious cleavage in society is large, high intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of liberties and relatively low income taxes., Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support ´ from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015 − 66883−P, Generalitat de Catalunya project number 2017SGR1359, and the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370, Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

The survival and demise of the state: a dynamic theory of secessions

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Flamand, Sabine
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Rohner, Dominic
This paper analizes the repeated interaction between groups in a country as a repeated Stackelberg game, where conflict and secession can occur on the equilibrium path owing to commitment problems. If a group out of power is small enough and its contribution to total surplus not too large, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period. When there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict can occur. While in the static model secession can occur only as a peaceful outcome, in the infinite horizon game with high discount factor secession may result following costly conflict. We discuss our full characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the light of the available empirical evidence., Joan Esteban gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015−66883−P, from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR1359, and from National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370. Massimo Morelli wishes to thank the European Research Council, advanced grant 694583. Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595., Peer reviewed