Pasar al contenido principal

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 11
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A politico-economic model of public expenditure and income taxation

  • Mayoral, Laura
  • Esteban, Joan
This paper contributes to the literature on majority voting over fiscal policies. We depart from the standard model in two dimensions. First, besides redistributing income, the government uses the net tax revenue to finance the provision of goods and services that become in-kind transfers to the citizens. By deciding on the composition of this expenditure (education, health, law-and-order, etc.), the government chooses the allocation of the benefits to the different income segments. This choice is a fundamental ingredient of fiscal policy. Second, we tackle the problem of choosing the income tax function and the composition of public expenditure by assuming that the political process selects one of these issues as the salient one. Political controversy and vote focus on this issue exclusively. The other dimension is determined in a way so as to minimize objections (obtain consensus) among the voters. We analyze the case where the salient policy is the composition of public expenditure. We show that for each voted expenditure policy, there is a unique income tax function that attains consensus. The political process we model yields that the progressiveness of the income tax schedule depends on income inequality interacted with the elasticity of substitution of the goods provided in the market and those publicly provided. This relationship is confirmed in our empirical test., Mayoral and Esteban research has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015—0563) and Grant ECO 2015—66883–P, Generalitat de Catalunya Project 2017SGR1359Δ, and the National Science Foundation Grant SES-1629370. Useful comments by Jordi Caballé, Eliana la Ferrara and Kalle Moene are gratefully acknowledged. Andrew Gianou has provided us with excellent research assistance.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Liberté, égalité…religiosité

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
We study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and the legal restrictions on personal liberties. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality experienced when others practice those liberties. We show that legal restrictions on liberties has an impact on income inequality. We find that when the religious cleavage in society is large, high intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of liberties and relatively low taxes., Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015-66883-P, Generalitat de Catalunya project number 2017SGR1359, and the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Predation, protection, and productivity: a firm-level perspective

  • Besley, Timothy
  • Mueller, Hannes
This paper studies the consequences of predation when firms deploy guard labor as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys, which ask about firm-level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across firms and from production to protection. The loss due to protection effort is substantial and patterns of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output losses. Various extensions are discussed., Mueller acknowledges support from the Ramon y Cajal Programme, the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant number ECO2015-66883-P and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Conflict and development

  • Ray, Debraj
  • Esteban, Joan
In this review, we examine the links between economic development and social conflict. By economic development, we refer broadly to aggregate changes in per capita income and wealth or in the distribution of that wealth. By social conflict, we refer to within-country unrest, ranging from peaceful demonstrations, processions, and strikes to violent riots and civil war. We organize our review by critically examining three common perceptions: that conflict declines with ongoing economic growth; that conflict is principally organized along economic differences rather than similarities; and that conflict, most especially in developing countries, is driven by ethnic motives., We are extremely grateful to the EDI Project, which sponsored and supported this research; in particular, we thank Jean-Marie Baland, Anne Michels, Jean-Philippe Platteau, and members of the Scientific Committee of the EDI Project, who provided useful comments and guidance. D.R. acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-1261560 and SES-1629370. J.E. acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministerio de Econom´ıa e Innovación under grant ECO2015-66883-P., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Can power-sharing foster peace? Evidence from Northern Ireland

  • Mueller, Hannes
  • Rohner, Dominic
In the absence of power-sharing, minority groups in opposition have powerful incentives to substitute the ballot with the bullet. In contrast, when power is shared among all major groups in society, the relative gains of sticking to electoral politics are larger for minority groups. After making the theoretical argument, we provide in the current paper an empirical analysis of the impact of power-sharing at the local level, making use of fine-grained data from Northern Ireland’s 26 local district councils over the 1973–2001 period. We find that power-sharing has a sizable and robust conflict-reducing impact., Hannes Mueller acknowledges financial support from Grant number ECO2015-66883-P, the Ramon y Cajal programme and the Severo Ochoa Programme, and Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595 "Policies for Peace"., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Institutions, volatility, and investment

  • Besley, Timothy
  • Mueller, Hannes
Countries with strong executive constraints have lower growth volatility but similar average growth to those with weak constraints. This paper argues that this may explain the relationship between executive constraints and inflows of foreign investment. It uses a novel dataset of Dutch sector-level investments between 1983 and 2012 to explore this issue. It formulates an economic model of investment and uses data on the mean and variance of productivity growth to explain the relationship between investment inflows and executive constraints. The model can account for the aggregate change in inflows when strong executive constraints are adopted in terms of the reduction in the volatility in productivity growth. The data and model together suggest a natural way of thinking about country-level heterogeneity in investment inflows following the adoption of strong executive constraints., Both authors thank the IGC for financial support. Mueller acknowledges financial support from the Ramon y Cajal programme, the MINECO/FEDER through project ECO2015-66883-P and the MINECO through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D ( SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Liberté, Égalité, ... Religiosité

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
In this paper we study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and over the legal restrictions on personal liberties. Religious teachings generally restrict individual behavior on issues such as consumption of some goods, sexual orientation, divorce, abortion, gay marriage, contraception and so on. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality experienced when others in society practice those liberties beyond what he deems adequate. The first assumption implies that, when the law allows for the use of liberties, secular individuals have a higher incentive to work than religious ones. As a result, the political choice of legal restrictions on liberties has an impact on income inequality. The second implies that religious individuals may prefer to repress liberties in society. As repression of liberties reduces income inequality, poor religious individuals may still prefer low taxes compared with richer and less religious ones. We also analyze the choice of redistribution and the legal cap on liberties as the majoritarian outcome in a citizen-candidate model. We obtain that when the majority of the population is religious and the religious cleavage in society is large, high intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of liberties and relatively low income taxes., Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support ´ from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015 − 66883−P, Generalitat de Catalunya project number 2017SGR1359, and the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370, Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

The survival and demise of the state: a dynamic theory of secessions

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Flamand, Sabine
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Rohner, Dominic
This paper analizes the repeated interaction between groups in a country as a repeated Stackelberg game, where conflict and secession can occur on the equilibrium path owing to commitment problems. If a group out of power is small enough and its contribution to total surplus not too large, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period. When there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict can occur. While in the static model secession can occur only as a peaceful outcome, in the infinite horizon game with high discount factor secession may result following costly conflict. We discuss our full characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the light of the available empirical evidence., Joan Esteban gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015−66883−P, from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR1359, and from National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370. Massimo Morelli wishes to thank the European Research Council, advanced grant 694583. Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Group inequality and the severity of civil conflict

  • Huber, John D.
  • Mayoral, Laura
This paper is a revised version of our previous work “Inequality, Ethnicity and Civil Conflict”, Civil conflicts, which have been much more prevalent than inter-state conflicts over the last fifty years, vary enormously in their intensity, with some causing millions of deaths and some far fewer. The central goal of this paper is to test an argument from previous theoretical research that high inequality within an ethnic group can make inter-ethnic conflict more violent because such inequality decreases the opportunity cost to poor group members of fighting, and also decreases the opportunity cost to rich group members of funding the conflict. To test this argument, we create a new data set that uses individual-level surveys to measure inequality within ethnic groups. The analysis using these data provide strong evidence for the importance of within-group inequality, and thus underscores the value of focusing on the capacity of groups to fight if one wishes to limit the destruction of civil conflicts., John Huber is grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0818381). Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya, and the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant Number ECO2015-66883-P and from National Science Foundation Grant SES-1629370 (PI: Debraj Ray).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A politico-economic model of public expenditure and income taxation

  • Mayoral, Laura
  • Esteban, Joan
This paper contributes to the literature on majority voting over fiscal policies. We depart from the standard model in two dimensions. First, besides redistributing income, the government uses the net tax revenue to finance the provision of goods and services that become in-kind transfers to the citizens. By deciding on the composition of this expenditure (education, health, law-and-order, etc.), the government chooses the allocation of the benefits to the different income segments. This choice is a fundamental ingredient of fiscal policy. Second, we tackle the problem of choosing the income tax function and the composition of public expenditure by assuming that the political process selects one of these issues as the salient one. Political controversy and vote focus on this issue exclusively. The other dimension is determined in a way so as to minimize objections (obtain consensus) among the voters. We analyze the case where the salient policy is the composition of public expenditure. We show that for each voted expenditure policy, there is a unique income tax function that attains consensus. The political process we model yields that the progressiveness of the income tax schedule depends on income inequality interacted with the elasticity of substitution of the goods provided in the market and those publicly provided. This relationship is confirmed in our empirical test., Mayoral and Esteban research has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015—0563) and Grant ECO 2015—66883–P, Generalitat de Catalunya Project 2017SGR1359Δ, and the National Science Foundation Grant SES-1629370. Useful comments by Jordi Caballé, Eliana la Ferrara and Kalle Moene are gratefully acknowledged. Andrew Gianou has provided us with excellent research assistance.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Predation, protection, and productivity, a firm-level perspective

  • Besley, Timothy
  • Mueller, Hannes|||0000-0001-7667-3971
This paper studies the consequences of predation when firms deploy guard labor as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys which ask about firm- level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across firms and from production to protection. The loss due to protection e¤ort is substantial and paterns of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output losses. Various extensions are discussed.