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REGLAS FISCALES Y REGULATORIAS PARA UN DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE

PID2019-105982GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2019
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

A claims problem approach to the cost allocation of a minimum cost spanning tree

  • Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
We propose to allocate the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree by defining a claims problem and using claims rules, then providing easy and intuitive ways to distribute this cost. Depending on the starting point that we consider, we define two models. On the one hand, the benefit-sharing model considers individuals’ costs to the source as the starting point, and then the benefit of building the efficient tree is shared by the agents. On the other hand, the costs-sharing model starts from the individuals’ minimum connection costs (the cheapest connection they can use), and the additional cost, if any, is then allocated. As we prove, both approaches provide the same family of allocations for every minimum cost spanning tree problem. These models can be understood as a central planner who decides the best way to connect the agents (the efficient tree) and also establishes the amount each agent has to pay. In so doing, the central planner takes into account the maximum and minimum amount they should pay and some equity criteria given by a particular (claims) rule. We analyze some properties of this family of cost allocations, specially focusing in coalitional stability (core selection), a central concern in the literature on cost allocation.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Distributing the European structural and investment funds from a conflicting claims approach

  • Solís-Baltodano, María-José
  • Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
In order to support economic development across all European Union regions, €351.8 billion –almost a third of the total EU budget– has been set aside for the Cohesion Policy during the 2014–2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through five main structural and investment funds, after long and difficult negotiations among the EU member states. This paper analyzes the problem of allocating the limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund as a conflicting claims problem. Specifically, we attempt to show how the conflicting claims approach fits this actual problem, and we propose alternative ways of distributing the budget via (i) claims solutions or (ii) the imposition of bounds (guarantees) to each of the regions. By applying this approach we also show that there is a claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality and promoting convergence to a greater degree. It is clear that political bargaining will always be part of the allocation process. However, having an intuitive initial proposal may help politicians to find the best agreement. To that effect, we propose the use of a claims solution as a way to find an initial proposal for future policy changes concerning the allocations of the EU structural funds.