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REGLAS FISCALES Y REGULATORIAS PARA UN DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE

PID2019-105982GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2019
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stackelberg social equilibrium in water markets

  • Houba, Harold
  • Tomori, Françeska
Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example of a duopoly market.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

A claims problem approach to the cost allocation of a minimum cost spanning tree

  • Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
We propose to allocate the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree by defining a claims problem and using claims rules, then providing easy and intuitive ways to distribute this cost. Depending on the starting point that we consider, we define two models. On the one hand, the benefit-sharing model considers individuals’ costs to the source as the starting point, and then the benefit of building the efficient tree is shared by the agents. On the other hand, the costs-sharing model starts from the individuals’ minimum connection costs (the cheapest connection they can use), and the additional cost, if any, is then allocated. As we prove, both approaches provide the same family of allocations for every minimum cost spanning tree problem. These models can be understood as a central planner who decides the best way to connect the agents (the efficient tree) and also establishes the amount each agent has to pay. In so doing, the central planner takes into account the maximum and minimum amount they should pay and some equity criteria given by a particular (claims) rule. We analyze some properties of this family of cost allocations, specially focusing in coalitional stability (core selection), a central concern in the literature on cost allocation.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Distributing the European structural and investment funds from a conflicting claims approach

  • Solís-Baltodano, María-José
  • Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
In order to support economic development across all European Union regions, €351.8 billion –almost a third of the total EU budget– has been set aside for the Cohesion Policy during the 2014–2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through five main structural and investment funds, after long and difficult negotiations among the EU member states. This paper analyzes the problem of allocating the limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund as a conflicting claims problem. Specifically, we attempt to show how the conflicting claims approach fits this actual problem, and we propose alternative ways of distributing the budget via (i) claims solutions or (ii) the imposition of bounds (guarantees) to each of the regions. By applying this approach we also show that there is a claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality and promoting convergence to a greater degree. It is clear that political bargaining will always be part of the allocation process. However, having an intuitive initial proposal may help politicians to find the best agreement. To that effect, we propose the use of a claims solution as a way to find an initial proposal for future policy changes concerning the allocations of the EU structural funds.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Regulatory commitment versus non-commitment: electric vehicle adoption under subsidies and emission standards

  • Theilen, Bernd
  • Tomori, Françeska
We compare two regulatory structures in the application of emission standards and a subsidy scheme in the automobile market. The regulator can either commit to an emission standard or is not able to commit. Firms compete á la Cournot and produce fuel-powered and electric vehicles. The emissions of fuel-powered vehicles can be abated by means of investing in emission-reducing innovation. Our results indicate that under commitment there are less emissions, higher subsidies and a major adoption of electric vehicles. By contrast, non-commitment yields more fuel-powered vehicles, more vehicles in total and higher consumer surplus. Electric vehicle producers obtain higher profits under commitment, whereas fuel-powered vehicle producers might be better off under both regulatory structures. Social welfare is higher under non-commitment as long as environmental damages are regarded severe. Otherwise, commitment is socially preferable. This result provides an explanation for observed differences in the duration of environmental standards between the US, the EU and China.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Market power in California's water market

  • Tomori, Françeska
  • Ansink, Erik
  • Houba, Harold
  • Hagerty, Nick
  • Bos, Charles
We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission in European Union through Applying the Claims Problems Approach

  • Salekpay, Foroogh|||0000-0001-5171-6111
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris Agreement for the period 2021-2030 which is a 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 (compared with GHG emission in 1990). EU member states have to emit at a level that is lower than their emission needs. To solve this problem, we implement the claims problems approach as a method for distributing insufficient resources among parties with greater demands. We use several well-known division rules to divide the emission budget among EU member states. We define a set of principles that should be satisfied by division rules to select the most optimal allocation method. To diminish the effect of countries' preferences on the allocation we use equity and stability criteria to examine the fairness of the rules. Moreover, we allocate the emission budget in two ways: First, we apply division rules to allocate the total emission budget for 2021-2030 among countries. Second, we allocate the emission budget annually from 2021 to 2030. We propose that Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) is an appropriate division rule to meet the target of 2030.