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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Winners' restraint or affective majoritarianism?, elections, polarization and political support

  • Tomic, Damjan|||0000-0003-4716-4005
  • Ferrer Juan, Sergio|||0000-0002-8387-2060
  • Prada Gonzalez, Enrique
  • Hernández, Enrique|||0000-0002-9219-9293
Research on the impact of elections on attitudes toward democracy has focused primarily on satisfaction with democracy. Building on this, we analyze how winning and losing elections, along with affective polarization, shapes citizens' support for norms of democratic restraint and consent. We propose that partisan animus weakens the "reservoir of goodwill" that helps citizens accept democratic norms that may go against their self interest. Using a comparative study of 35 elections and two quasi-experimental case studies, we find that while differences between winners and losers in their support for norms of restraint and consent can be statistically significant, they are substantively small compared to several benchmarks, even in highly polarized contexts. Thus, while satisfaction with democracy is notably shaped by winner-loser dynamics, especially when polarization is high, the impact of those dynamics on support for core democratic principles is limited. These findings improve our understanding of the role of citizens in democratic processes.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Too crooked to be good? Trade-offs in the electoral punishment of malfeasance and corruption

  • Breitenstein, Sofia
  • Hernández, Enrique
While elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable, corrupt politicians are often re-elected. A potential explanation for this paradox is that citizens trade-off integrity for competence. Voters may forgive corruption if corrupt politicians manage to deliver desirable outcomes. While previous studies have examined whether politicians’ competence moderates the negative effect of corruption, this paper focuses on voters’ priorities and directly assesses what citizens value more: integrity or favourable outcomes. Using a survey experiment, we assess citizens’ support for politicians who violate the law in order to improve the welfare of their community and, in some cases, benefit personally from these violations. The results indicate that citizens prefer a politician who follows the law, even if this leads to a suboptimal outcome. However, voters are more likely to overlook violations of the law that benefit the community if these do not result in a personal gain for politicians (i.e., in the absence of corruption). These findings suggest that the mild electoral punishment of corruption may be due to the public’s unawareness of private gains from malfeasance, or to the delay in these private benefits becoming apparent by election day., The data of this study were collected within the project “LIMCOR: Limits to political corruption” (Fundació La Caixa 2016 ACUPO177) and “Political Change in Spain: Populism, Feminism and new dimensions of conflict” (CSO2017-83086-R). Breitenstein acknowledges the financial support of the FPI grant (BES-2015-072756) from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity and the European Social Fund. Hernández acknowledges funding from the ERC-2021-STG DEMOTRADEOFF, grant number 101042292.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Too crooked to be good? Trade-offs in the electoral punishment of malfeasance and corruption

  • Breitenstein, Sofia
  • Hernández, Enrique
While elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable, corrupt politicians are often re-elected. A potential explanation for this paradox is that citizens trade-off integrity for competence. Voters may forgive corruption if corrupt politicians manage to deliver desirable outcomes. While previous studies have examined whether politicians’ competence moderates the negative effect of corruption, this paper focuses on voters’ priorities and directly assesses what citizens value more: integrity or favourable outcomes. Using a survey experiment, we assess citizens’ support for politicians who violate the law in order to improve the welfare of their community and, in some cases, benefit personally from these violations. The results indicate that citizens prefer a politician who follows the law, even if this leads to a suboptimal outcome. However, voters are more likely to overlook violations of the law that benefit the community if these do not result in a personal gain for politicians (i.e., in the absence of corruption). These findings suggest that the mild electoral punishment of corruption may be due to the public’s unawareness of private gains from malfeasance, or to the delay in these private benefits becoming apparent by election day., The data of this study were collected within the project “LIMCOR: Limits to political corruption” (Fundació La Caixa 2016 ACUPO177) and “Political Change in Spain: Populism, Feminism and new dimensions of conflict” (CSO2017-83086-R). Breitenstein acknowledges the financial support of the FPI grant (BES-2015-072756) from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity and the European Social Fund. Hernández acknowledges funding from the ERC-2021-STG DEMOTRADEOFF, grant number 101042292.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Too Crooked to be Good?, trade-offs in the Electoral Punishment of Malfeasance and Corruption

  • Breitenstein, Sofia|||0000-0002-5591-3320
  • Hernández, Enrique|||0000-0002-9219-9293
While elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable, corrupt politicians are often re-elected. A potential explanation for this paradox is that citizens trade-off integrity for competence. Voters may forgive corruption if corrupt politicians manage to deliver desirable outcomes. While previous studies have examined whether politicians' competence moderates the negative effect of corruption, this paper focuses on voters' priorities and directly assesses what citizens value more: integrity or favourable outcomes. Using a survey experiment, we assess citizens' support for politicians who violate the law in order to improve the welfare of their community and, in some cases, benefit personally from these violations. The results indicate that citizens prefer a politician who follows the law, even if this leads to a suboptimal outcome. However, voters are more likely to overlook violations of the law that benefit the community if these do not result in a personal gain for politicians (i.e., in the absence of corruption). These findings suggest that the mild electoral punishment of corruption may be due to the public's unawareness of private gains from malfeasance, or to the delay in these private benefits becoming apparent by election day.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The (null) effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Europeans' attitudes toward democracy

  • Hernández, Enrique|||0000-0002-9219-9293
  • Ares, Macarena|||0000-0002-8156-9498
In this paper, we analyze the short-term impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Europeans' attitudes toward democracy. For this purpose, we leverage the coincidence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 with the fieldwork of the European Social Survey in 10 countries. By means of an unexpected event during survey design, we analyze the impact of the invasion on 12 different attitudes toward democracy, including overt support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, as well as the importance attributed to particular democratic principles. The results of this comprehensive analysis reveal that the invasion did not have a substantive impact on individuals' attitudes toward democracy. The invasion of a neighboring democratic country by an autocratic power did not alter Europeans' satisfaction with democracy, their support for this political regime, or the importance they attribute to different democratic principles.