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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Standard-setting and the incentives to innovate: evidence from the IEEE patent policy update

  • Bonani, Michela
This paper investigates how stricter licensing rules affect firms' incentives to innovate in standardrelated technologies. I study the 2015 patent policy revision by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which limited SEP holders' ability to seek injunctions and encouraged royalties based on the smallest salable unit. Using a continuous difference-in-differences approach, I show that the new policy increases standard-related patenting, with the strongest effects among firms furthest from the standards' technology space. However, the effects differ across firm types. SEP holders reduced their innovation activity, consistent with weaker royalty incentives, while non-SEP firms expanded patenting, benefiting from lower licensing costs and new opportunities to reposition themselves. Although the policy created challenges for SEP owners, my results suggest that the broader increase in innovation among other firms outweighed these declines. These results highlight how patent policy design within standard setting organizations can reallocate innovation incentives across firms., Financial support from the ERC consolidator grant for the project Foundations for Antitrust and Policy on Digital Platforms (No. 101044072) is gratefully acknowledged.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The 'kill zone': when a platform copies to eliminate a potential threat

  • Motta, Massimo
  • Shelegia, Sandro
Data de publicació electrònica: 23-09-2024, A monopoly platform may prevent a startup which sells a complementary product from developing a competing platform by copying it. Imitation reduces the potential rival's profits from the new platform and thus its incentives to invest. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behavior may also create an 'ex ante' effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a new platform (i.e., not to enter the 'kill zone') and to develop another (noncompeting) product instead. This finding is robust to several extensions., We have benefited from the BBVA Foundation for a grant within the program "Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a Equipos de Investigacion Cientifica 2019." We also acknowledge financial aid from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) and FEDER (project ECO2016-76998-P) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the research grant RYC-2016-20307 and from the European Commission via ERC grant for the project FAPoD (101044072).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Retailer-led marketplaces

  • Hervas-Drane, Andres
  • Shelegia, Sandro
Leading retailers have opened up their online storefronts to competitors by operating marketplaces for third-party sellers. We develop a model of entry and price competition at the product market level to analyze the competitive interactions arising within these retailer-led marketplaces. We show that the retailer benefits from the marketplace by mitigating his own capacity constraints and manages competition from third-party sellers through his control of the storefront: by setting the marketplace fee, by steering consumers, and by allocating his own capacity in response to the product supply choices of third-party sellers. We draw managerial implications and examine policy interventions. We find that regulation of marketplace fees has the strongest potential to increase welfare outcomes. Our model provides novel insights into the mechanisms at play in retailer-led marketplaces and explains their prominent role in online retail., This work was supported by H2020 European Research Council [Grant FAPoD 101044072];Fundación Carmen y Severo Ochoa [Grant CEX2019-000915-S]; Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad [Grant RYC-2016-20307]; BBVA Foundation grant within program "Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a Equipos de Investigacion Cientifica 2019."
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The 'kill zone': when a platform copies to eliminate a potential threat

  • Motta, Massimo
  • Shelegia, Sandro
Data de publicació electrònica: 23-09-2024, A monopoly platform may prevent a startup which sells a complementary product from developing a competing platform by copying it. Imitation reduces the potential rival's profits from the new platform and thus its incentives to invest. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behavior may also create an 'ex ante' effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a new platform (i.e., not to enter the 'kill zone') and to develop another (noncompeting) product instead. This finding is robust to several extensions., We have benefited from the BBVA Foundation for a grant within the program "Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a Equipos de Investigacion Cientifica 2019." We also acknowledge financial aid from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) and FEDER (project ECO2016-76998-P) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the research grant RYC-2016-20307 and from the European Commission via ERC grant for the project FAPoD (101044072).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Standard-setting and the incentives to innovate: evidence from the IEEE patent policy update

  • Bonani, Michela
This paper investigates how stricter licensing rules affect firms' incentives to innovate in standardrelated technologies. I study the 2015 patent policy revision by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which limited SEP holders' ability to seek injunctions and encouraged royalties based on the smallest salable unit. Using a continuous difference-in-differences approach, I show that the new policy increases standard-related patenting, with the strongest effects among firms furthest from the standards' technology space. However, the effects differ across firm types. SEP holders reduced their innovation activity, consistent with weaker royalty incentives, while non-SEP firms expanded patenting, benefiting from lower licensing costs and new opportunities to reposition themselves. Although the policy created challenges for SEP owners, my results suggest that the broader increase in innovation among other firms outweighed these declines. These results highlight how patent policy design within standard setting organizations can reallocate innovation incentives across firms., Financial support from the ERC consolidator grant for the project Foundations for Antitrust and Policy on Digital Platforms (No. 101044072) is gratefully acknowledged.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Retailer-led marketplaces

  • Hervas-Drane, Andres
  • Shelegia, Sandro
Leading retailers have opened up their online storefronts to competitors by operating marketplaces for third-party sellers. We develop a model of entry and price competition at the product market level to analyze the competitive interactions arising within these retailer-led marketplaces. We show that the retailer benefits from the marketplace by mitigating his own capacity constraints and manages competition from third-party sellers through his control of the storefront: by setting the marketplace fee, by steering consumers, and by allocating his own capacity in response to the product supply choices of third-party sellers. We draw managerial implications and examine policy interventions. We find that regulation of marketplace fees has the strongest potential to increase welfare outcomes. Our model provides novel insights into the mechanisms at play in retailer-led marketplaces and explains their prominent role in online retail., This work was supported by H2020 European Research Council [Grant FAPoD 101044072];Fundación Carmen y Severo Ochoa [Grant CEX2019-000915-S]; Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad [Grant RYC-2016-20307]; BBVA Foundation grant within program "Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a Equipos de Investigacion Cientifica 2019."