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RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from prisoner&apos, s dilemma to snowdrift

  • Chao, Lin
  • ELENA FITO, SANTIAGO FCO
[EN] The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner s Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods., Work was supported by grants to L.C. from the National Science Foundation (DEB-1354253) and to S.F.E. from Spain's Ministries of Education, Culture and Sport (Salvador de Madariaga Programme PRX15/00149) and Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (BFU2015-65037-P), Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/021) and the European Commission 7th Framework Programme EvoEvo Project (grant ICT-610427)