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Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas
We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.
Proyecto:
Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-116771GB-I00
,
Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2019-106642GB-I00
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Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-114309GB-I00
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Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2021/SGR-00194
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Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2021/SGR-00570