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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow's impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Chatterji, Shurojit
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Platform design and rent extraction

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Schuett, Florian
We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Leading players in the industry (e.g., the Booking Group) hold two types of platforms in their portfolio: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (like Booking.com) and anonymous platforms that do not (like Hotwire.com). Anonymous platforms offer discounts but lead to inefficient matching between consumers and firms. We develop a model in which horizontally differentiated firms sell to heterogeneous consumers both directly and via a platform that enlarges the pool of consumers they can attract. The platform charges firms for transactions it intermediates and can choose to offer an anonymous sales channel in addition to a revealing one. We show that offering both sales channels is profitable not only because it allows the platform to implement price discrimination, as suggested by the literature on opaque selling, but also because it improves rent extraction. The anonymous channel breaks the link between the price on the revealing channel and the firms' outside option; moreover, it can reduce double marginalisation. The welfare impact of the anonymous channel is ambiguous: while it sometimes leads to market expansion, it also causes inefficiently high transport costs.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Group obvious strategy-proofness, definition and characterization

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Arribillaga, Pablo
We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)'s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-telling remains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function. We show that this stronger condition is no more restrictive: the set of all group obviously strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of all obviously strategy-proof social choice functions. Building on this equivalence result and existing results on obvious strategy-proofness, we derive further equivalence results concerning the implementability of social choice functions via round-table mechanisms: strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and group obvious strategy-proofness are all equivalent.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The rate of surplus value and the structure of the tax system

  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
The objective of this work is twofold. First, it aims to establish procedures for approximating the rate of surplus value using disaggregated data published by statistical agencies. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it highlights that the dynamics of the rate of surplus value should be regarded as a preferred indicator for assessing the effects of public policies, particularly taxation. This is because not all taxes impact the rate equally. To illustrate the potential of this analytical approach, we employ recent data from Spain, organized in a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple anonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.