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RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Parallel Maude-NPA for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis

  • Do, Canh Minh
  • Riesco, Adrian
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
[EN] Maude-NPA is a formal verification tool for analyzing cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao strand space model modulo an equational theory defining the cryptographic primitives. It starts from an attack state to find counterexamples or conclude that the attack concerned cannot be conducted by performing a backward narrowing reachability analysis. Although Maude-NPA is a powerful analyzer, its running performance can be improved by taking advantage of parallel and/or distributed computing when dealing with complex protocols whose state space is huge. This paper describes a parallel version of Maude-NPA in which the backward narrowing and the transition subsumption at each layer in Maude-NPA are conducted in parallel. A tool supporting the parallel version has been implemented in Maude with a master-worker model using meta-interpreters. We report on some experiments of various kinds of protocols that demonstrate that the tool can increase the running performance of Maude-NPA by 52% on average for complex case studies in which the number of states located at each layer is considerably large., This workwas supported in part by the JST SICORP under Grant JPMJSC20C2, Japan,in part by JSPS KAKENHI under Grant JP23K28060, Grant JP23K19959,Grant JP24K20757, Grant JP24KK0185, in part by the ProCode10 under Grant PID2023-149943OB-I00, in part by MICIN under Grant PID2021-122830OB-C42, in part by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, in part by ERDF A way ofmaking Europe under Grant CIPROM/2022/6, in part by Generalitat Valenciana,and in part by INCIBE's Chair funded by the EU-NextGenerationEU throughthe Spanish government's Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Formalization and analysis of the post-quantum signature scheme FALCON with Maude

  • García-Valero, Víctor|||0000-0003-0681-1130
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
[EN] Digital signatures ensure the authenticity and integrity of digital assets, vital properties for any secure communication. The National Institute of Standards and Technologies launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography project to standardise new algorithms and protocols that are secure against quantum attackers. The post-quantum signature scheme FALCON was one of the finalists. We present a continuation of the first steps towards the formal specification and analysis, in the high-performance language Maude, of signature schemes. We have adapted and improved a previous framework, originally aimed to formally specify and analyse post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms. As a use case of the new framework, we specify an executable symbolic model of FALCON. On the symbolic model, we verify termination and fairness using LTL formulas with Maude's model checker. Furthermore, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation are analysed through invariant analysis. Integrity and non-repudiation hold, meanwhile, authentication does not hold in our symbolic model., star Santiago Escobar and Victor Garcia have been partially supported by the grant PID2021-122830OB-C42 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF A way of making Europe, by the grant CIPROM/2022/6 funded by Generalitat Valenciana, by INCIBE's Chair funded by the EU-NextGenerationEU through the Spanish government's Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia, and by the grant PCI2020-120708-2 funded by MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR. Kazuhiro Ogata has been partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 24KK0185.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Symbolic Analysis and Verification of Hybrid Post-Quantum TLS 1.2

  • Tran, Duong Dinh
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Akleylek, Sedat
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
[EN] Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a fundamental protocol for securing communications over untrusted networks. With the rising threat of quantum computing, Amazon Web Services (AWS) proposed Hybrid Post-Quantum (PQ) TLS, an extended version of TLS 1.2 designed to resist quantum attacks. In this paper, we present a formal symbolic analysis of the AWS protocol proposal using the CafeOBJ algebraic specification language and the Invariant Proof Score Generator (IPSG) tool. Our analysis formally evaluates the protocol's resilience under two attacker models: one where classical primitives fail (by quantum adversaries), and one where PQ primitives are compromised (as they are relatively new). We verify key security properties, including the confidentiality of session keys, confidentiality of ephemeral secret keys, and forward secrecy, against both classical and quantum adversaries, confirming the security claims of the proposal. All proofs are executable within the CafeOBJ system and hold for an unbounded number of protocol participants and sessions. Although authentication is beyond the scope of the AWS protocol, we propose an improved version that incorporates hybrid digital signatures to restore quantum-safe authentication., The work of Duong Dinh Tran and Kazuhiro Ogata was supported by JST SICORP, Japan, under Grant JPMJSC20C2, and by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 24KK0185 and 23K28060. The work of Santiago Escobar was supported by the grant PID2024-162030OB-100 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and by the grant CIPROM/2022/6 funded by Generalitat Valenciana. The work of Sedat Akleylek was supported in part by the Estonian Research Council under Grant PRG2531, No 2-2/24/541-1, and in part by TUBITAK under Grant 121R006.