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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Exploring European regional trade

  • Santamaría, Marta (Santamaría Monturiol)
  • Ventura, Jaume
  • Yeşilbayraktar, Uğur
We use the new dataset of trade flows across 269 European regions in 24 countries constructed in Santamaría et al. (2020) to systematically explore for the first time trade patterns within and across country borders. We focus on the differences between home trade, country trade and foreign trade. We document the following facts: (i) European regional trade has a strong home and country bias, (ii) geographic distance and national borders are important determinants of regional trade, but cannot explain the strong regional home bias and (iii) the home bias is heterogeneous across regions and seems to be driven by political regional borders., Jaume Ventura acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program Advanced Grant (693512 - GEPPS), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (CEX2019-000915-S) and from the Generalitat de Catalunya through the CERCA and SGR Programme (2017-SGR-1393).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: sharing a government

  • Ventura, Jaume
This paper develops a simple theoretical framework to study a set of regions, each with its own regional government, who share a union or central government. These governments must decide whether to implement or discard a large number of projects that produce local benefits for the region that implements them, and externalities for the rest of the regions. Conflict or disagreement arises since different regions value projects differently. The classic assignment problem consists of deciding who decides these projects, either the union or the regional governments. It is well known that regional governments are insensitive to externalities. The key observation here is that the union government is insensitive to local benefits. Thus, each government maximizes only a piece of the value of projects, and disregards the other one. This observation leads to simple and clear rules for solving the assignment problem., I acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme,Grant Agreement 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”), the Generalitat de Catalunya (CERCA program and grant 2014 SGR 830), and the Barcelona GSE.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Globalization and political structure

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
Supplemental material files: online appendix; replication files, This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We show that political structure adapts in a non-monotonic way to declining transport costs. Borders hamper trade. At an earlier stage, the political response to expanding trade opportunities consists of removing borders by increasing country size. At a later stage, instead, it consists of removing the cost of borders by creating international unions. This leads to a reduction in country size. Moreover, diplomacy replaces conquest as a tool to ensure market access. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence on trade, territorial changes, and membership of international unions., We acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (StG-240989-GOPG, AdG-693512-GEPPS and StG-714905-CITIZINGLOBAL); the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033: RYC-2013-13838, SEV-2015-0563, CEX2019-000915-S and PID2019-111691RA-I00); the Generalitat de Catalunya through CERCA, the Institut d’Estudis Autonomics and the SGR Programme (2014-SGR-830 and 2017-SGR-1393); and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A theory of economic unions

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
After decades of successful growth, economic unions have recently become the focus of heightened political controversy. To understand why, we develop a theoretical model of the effects on trade, income distribution and welfare of economic unions that differ in size and scope. Our model shows that political support for international unions can grow with their breadth and depth provided member countries are sufficiently similar. However, dif- ferences in economic size and factor endowments can trigger disagreement over the value of unions. Our model is consistent with some salient features of the process of European integration and statistical evidence from survey data., We acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme, Grant Agreements 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”) and 714905 (“Citizens, Institutions and Globalization”), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya through the CERCA program, and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On public spending and economic unions

  • Broner, Fernando
  • Martin, Alberto, 1974-
  • Ventura, Jaume
We analyze the conduct of fiscal policy in a financially integrated union in the presence of financial frictions. Frictions create a wedge between the return to investment and the union interest rate. This leads to an over-spending externality. While the social cost of spending is the return to investment, governments care mostly about the (depressed) interest rate they face. In other words, the crowding-out effects of public spending are partly “exported” to the rest of the union. We argue that it may be hard for the union to deal with this externality through the design of fiscal rules, which are bound to be shaped by the preferences of the median country and not by efficiency considerations. We also analyze how this overspending externality—and the union’s ability to deal with it effectively—changes when the union is financially integrated with the rest of the world. Finally, we extend our model by introducing a zero lower bound on interest rates and show that, if financial frictions are severe enough, the union is pushed into a liquidity trap and the direction of the spending externality is reversed. At such times, fiscal rules that are appropriate during normal times might backfire., Broner and Martin acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through the I+D Excelencia grant (ECO2016-79823-P). Broner, Martin and Ventura acknowledge support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D grant (CEX2019-000915-S), from the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR grant 2017SGR01393), the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya, and from the Barcelona GSE Research Network. In addition, both Martin and Ventura acknowledge support from the ERC Consolidator Grant FP7-615651-MacroColl and Horizon 2020 Programme, Advanced Grant 2020- 693512-GEPPS respectively.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: sharing a government

  • Ventura, Jaume
This paper develops a simple theoretical framework to study a set of regions, each with its own regional government, who share a union or central government. These governments must decide whether to implement or discard a large number of projects that produce local benefits for the region that implements them, and externalities for the rest of the regions. Conflict or disagreement arises since different regions value projects differently. The classic assignment problem consists of deciding who decides these projects, either the union or the regional governments. It is well known that regional governments are insensitive to externalities. The key observation here is that the union government is insensitive to local benefits. Thus, each government maximizes only a piece of the value of projects, and disregards the other one. This observation leads to simple and clear rules for solving the assignment problem., I acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme,Grant Agreement 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”), the Generalitat de Catalunya (CERCA program and grant 2014 SGR 830), and the Barcelona GSE.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Exploring European regional trade

  • Santamaría, Marta (Santamaría Monturiol)
  • Ventura, Jaume
  • Yeşilbayraktar, Uğur
We use the new dataset of trade flows across 269 European regions in 24 countries constructed in Santamaría et al. (2020) to systematically explore for the first time trade patterns within and across country borders. We focus on the differences between home trade, country trade and foreign trade. We document the following facts: (i) European regional trade has a strong home and country bias, (ii) geographic distance and national borders are important determinants of regional trade, but cannot explain the strong regional home bias and (iii) the home bias is heterogeneous across regions and seems to be driven by political regional borders., Jaume Ventura acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program Advanced Grant (693512 - GEPPS), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (CEX2019-000915-S) and from the Generalitat de Catalunya through the CERCA and SGR Programme (2017-SGR-1393).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A theory of economic unions

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
After decades of successful growth, economic unions have recently become the focus of heightened political controversy. To understand why, we develop a theoretical model of the effects on trade, income distribution and welfare of economic unions that differ in size and scope. Our model shows that political support for international unions can grow with their breadth and depth provided member countries are sufficiently similar. However, dif- ferences in economic size and factor endowments can trigger disagreement over the value of unions. Our model is consistent with some salient features of the process of European integration and statistical evidence from survey data., We acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme, Grant Agreements 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”) and 714905 (“Citizens, Institutions and Globalization”), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya through the CERCA program, and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On public spending and economic unions

  • Broner, Fernando
  • Martin, Alberto, 1974-
  • Ventura, Jaume
We analyze the conduct of fiscal policy in a financially integrated union in the presence of financial frictions. Frictions create a wedge between the return to investment and the union interest rate. This leads to an over-spending externality. While the social cost of spending is the return to investment, governments care mostly about the (depressed) interest rate they face. In other words, the crowding-out effects of public spending are partly “exported” to the rest of the union. We argue that it may be hard for the union to deal with this externality through the design of fiscal rules, which are bound to be shaped by the preferences of the median country and not by efficiency considerations. We also analyze how this overspending externality—and the union’s ability to deal with it effectively—changes when the union is financially integrated with the rest of the world. Finally, we extend our model by introducing a zero lower bound on interest rates and show that, if financial frictions are severe enough, the union is pushed into a liquidity trap and the direction of the spending externality is reversed. At such times, fiscal rules that are appropriate during normal times might backfire., Broner and Martin acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through the I+D Excelencia grant (ECO2016-79823-P). Broner, Martin and Ventura acknowledge support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D grant (CEX2019-000915-S), from the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR grant 2017SGR01393), the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya, and from the Barcelona GSE Research Network. In addition, both Martin and Ventura acknowledge support from the ERC Consolidator Grant FP7-615651-MacroColl and Horizon 2020 Programme, Advanced Grant 2020- 693512-GEPPS respectively.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Globalization and political structure

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
Supplemental material files: online appendix; replication files, This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We show that political structure adapts in a non-monotonic way to declining transport costs. Borders hamper trade. At an earlier stage, the political response to expanding trade opportunities consists of removing borders by increasing country size. At a later stage, instead, it consists of removing the cost of borders by creating international unions. This leads to a reduction in country size. Moreover, diplomacy replaces conquest as a tool to ensure market access. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence on trade, territorial changes, and membership of international unions., We acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (StG-240989-GOPG, AdG-693512-GEPPS and StG-714905-CITIZINGLOBAL); the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033: RYC-2013-13838, SEV-2015-0563, CEX2019-000915-S and PID2019-111691RA-I00); the Generalitat de Catalunya through CERCA, the Institut d’Estudis Autonomics and the SGR Programme (2014-SGR-830 and 2017-SGR-1393); and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.