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UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publicación Estudio, informe, memoria (Report)

sVote with control components voting protocol: computational proof of complete verifiability and privacy

  • Larraia, Enrique
  • Finogina, Tamara
  • Costa Mirada, Nuria
This document details the cryptographic analysis of the sVote v2.2.1 system - an e-voting solution developed by Scytl for the Switzerland context. We prove the complete verifiability and privacy under the Swiss legislation's informally stated goals. First, we derive the trust model for complete verifiability and voting secrecy from the Swiss Chancellery's requirements, supporting our interpretation by quotes from and references to relevant excerpts of the ordinance and the corresponding technical annex. Then, based on the derived model, we prove that sVote with Control Components provides complete verifiability and guarantees voting secrecy and the non-disclosure of early provisional results. We demonstrate that sVote fulfills the requirements of the Swiss federal chancellery for completely verifiable E-voting systems. In other words, we show that an adversary cannot break the complete verifiability and voting secrecy properties of sVote without being detected by either the voter or auditors., sVote with Control components is a cryptographic voting protocol that provides complete verifiability and guarantees voting secrecy and the non-disclosure of early provisional results. This report demonstrates that sVote fulfills the requirements of the Swiss federal chancellery for completely verifiable E-voting systems. We extract precise requirements from the ordinance and the corresponding technical annex and model the sVote cryptographic voting protocol based on its design documents. Based on this model, we show in a detailed security analysis that an adversary cannot break the complete verifiability and voting secrecy properties of sVote without being detected by either the voter or by auditors, This work has received funding from the European Commission under the auspices of PROMETHEUS Project, Horizon 2020 Innovation Action (Grant Agreement No. 780701).
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Shorter lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs for the correctness of a shuffle

  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier|||0000-0001-5141-7234
  • Martínez Pinilla, Ramiro|||0000-0003-0496-6462
  • Sánchez Torrón, Manuel
In an electronic voting procedure, mixing networks are used to ensure anonymity of the casted votes. Each node of the network re-encrypts the input list of ciphertexts and randomly permutes it in a process named shuffle, and must prove (in zero-knowledge) that the process was applied honestly. To maintain security of such a process in a post-quantum scenario, new proofs are based on different mathematical assumptions, such as lattice-based problems. Nonetheless, the best lattice-based protocols to ensure verifiable shuffling have linear communication complexity on N, the number of shuffled ciphertexts. In this paper we propose the first sub-linear (on N) post-quantum zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle, for which we have mainly used two ideas: arithmetic circuit satisfiability results from Baum et al. (CRYPTO'2018) and Beneš networks to model a permutation of N elements. The achieved communication complexity of our protocol with respect to N is O(v(N)log^2(N)), but we will also highlight its dependency on other important parameters of the underlying lattice ingredients., The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci´on (MICINN), under Project PID2019-109379RB-I00 and by the European Union PROMETHEUS project (Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program, grant 780701). Authors thank Tjerand Silde for pointing out an incorrect set of parameters (Section 4.1) that we had proposed in a previous version of the manuscript.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Shorter lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs for the correctness of a shuffle

  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier
  • Martínez Pinilla, Ramiro
  • Sánchez Torrón, Manuel
In an electronic voting procedure, mixing networks are used to ensure anonymity of the casted votes. Each node of the network re-encrypts the input list of ciphertexts and randomly permutes it in a process named shuffle, and must prove (in zero-knowledge) that the process was applied honestly. To maintain security of such a process in a post-quantum scenario, new proofs are based on different mathematical assumptions, such as lattice-based problems. Nonetheless, the best lattice-based protocols to ensure verifiable shuffling have linear communication complexity on N, the number of shuffled ciphertexts. In this paper we propose the first sub-linear (on N) post-quantum zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle, for which we have mainly used two ideas: arithmetic circuit satisfiability results from Baum et al. (CRYPTO'2018) and Beneš networks to model a permutation of N elements. The achieved communication complexity of our protocol with respect to N is O(v(N)log^2(N)), but we will also highlight its dependency on other important parameters of the underlying lattice ingredients., The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci´on (MICINN), under Project PID2019-109379RB-I00 and by the European Union PROMETHEUS project (Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program, grant 780701). Authors thank Tjerand Silde for pointing out an incorrect set of parameters (Section 4.1) that we had proposed in a previous version of the manuscript., Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación

sVote with control components voting protocol: computational proof of complete verifiability and privacy

  • Larraia, Enrique
  • Finogina, Tamara
  • Costa Mirada, Nuria
This document details the cryptographic analysis of the sVote v2.2.1 system - an e-voting solution developed by Scytl for the Switzerland context. We prove the complete verifiability and privacy under the Swiss legislation's informally stated goals. First, we derive the trust model for complete verifiability and voting secrecy from the Swiss Chancellery's requirements, supporting our interpretation by quotes from and references to relevant excerpts of the ordinance and the corresponding technical annex. Then, based on the derived model, we prove that sVote with Control Components provides complete verifiability and guarantees voting secrecy and the non-disclosure of early provisional results. We demonstrate that sVote fulfills the requirements of the Swiss federal chancellery for completely verifiable E-voting systems. In other words, we show that an adversary cannot break the complete verifiability and voting secrecy properties of sVote without being detected by either the voter or auditors., sVote with Control components is a cryptographic voting protocol that provides complete verifiability and guarantees voting secrecy and the non-disclosure of early provisional results. This report demonstrates that sVote fulfills the requirements of the Swiss federal chancellery for completely verifiable E-voting systems. We extract precise requirements from the ordinance and the corresponding technical annex and model the sVote cryptographic voting protocol based on its design documents. Based on this model, we show in a detailed security analysis that an adversary cannot break the complete verifiability and voting secrecy properties of sVote without being detected by either the voter or by auditors, This work has received funding from the European Commission under the auspices of PROMETHEUS Project, Horizon 2020 Innovation Action (Grant Agreement No. 780701)., Preprint