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RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Formal Analysis of Post-Quantum Hybrid Key Exchange SSH Transport Layer Protocol

  • Tran, Duong Dinh
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Akleylek, Sedat
  • Otmani, Ayoub
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
[EN] Facing the quantum attack threat, a quantum-resistant version of the SSH Transport Layer protocol has been proposed and been standardized by an IETF working group. This standardization process has been motivated by the fact that if practical quantum computers become available, classical key exchange algorithms used today will no longer be safe because their security can be efficiently broken by Shor's algorithm running on a quantum computer. In this paper, we construct a symbolic model of the proposed protocol, specify it in the specification language CafeOBJ, and conduct a formal analysis of the claimed security properties with the employment of a formal method tool called Invariant Proof Score Generator (IPSG). Three security properties are formally verified with respect to an unbounded number of protocol participants and protocol executions by employing IPSG to produce their formal proofs, the so- called proof scores in CafeOBJ. With another property, namely authentication, we find a counterexample against it, and then we propose to slightly revise the protocol. With the improved version, we formally verify that the authentication property is enjoyed, while the three properties remain secure. To model the presence of malicious participants, we extend the Dolev-Yao intruder, which is the standard intruder model used in security protocol analysis/verification, because the availability assumption of large-scale quantum computers gives the attacker some new capabilities. Under our threat model, the intruder is given capabilities of fully controlling the network as the Dolev-Yao intruder, and additionally breaking ECDH's security as well as compromising secrets., The work of Duong Dinh Tran and Kazuhiro Ogata was supported by the JST SICORP, Japan, under Grant JPMJSC20C2. The work of Santiago Escobar was supported in part by the MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF A way of making Europe under Grant PID2021-122830OB-C42, in part by the Generalitat Valenciana under Grant CIPROM/2022/6, in part by the MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 under Grant PCI2020-120708-2, and in part by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR. The work of Sedat Akleylek was supported in part by TUBITAK under Grant 121R006. The work of Ayoub Otmani was supported in part by the FAVPQC Project funded by CNRS, and in part by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) within France 2030 Program under Grant ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Modelling and verification of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms using Maude

  • García-Valero, Víctor|||0000-0003-0681-1130
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Akleylek, Sedat
  • Otmani, Ayoub
[EN] Communication and information technologies shape the world's systems of today, and those systems shape our society. The security of those systems relies on mathematical problems that are hard to solve for classical computers, that is, the available current computers. Recent advances in quantum computing threaten the security of our systems and the communications we use. In order to face this threat, multiple solutions and protocols have been proposed in the Post-Quantum Cryptography project carried on by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies. The presented work focuses on defining a formal framework in Maude for the security analysis of different postquantum key encapsulation mechanisms under assumptions given under the DolevYao model. Through the use of our framework, we construct a symbolic model to represent the behaviour of each of the participants of the protocol in a network. We then conduct reachability analysis and find a man-in-the-middle attack in each of them and a design vulnerability in Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation. For both cases, we provide some insights on possible solutions. Then, we use the Maude Linear Temporal Logic model checker to extend the analysis of the symbolic system regarding security, liveness and fairness properties. Liveness and fairness properties hold while the security property does not due to the man-in-the-middle attack and the design vulnerability in Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation., Victor Garcia and Santiago Escobar were supported by the grant PID2021-122830OB-C42 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF A way of making Europe and by the grant PCI2020-120708-2 funded by MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR. Kazuhiro Ogata was supported by JST SICORP Grant Number JPMJSC20C2, Japan. Sedat Akleylek was supported by TUBITAK under Grant No. 121R006. Ayoub Otmani was supported by FAVPQC project funded by CNRS and by the grant ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS funded by Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) within France 2030 program. There was no additional external funding received for this study. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.