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ECONOMIA Y CAMBIO CLIMATICO: DETERMINANTES, DESIGUALDADES Y MITIGACION

BES-2016-078156

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Promoción del Talento y su Empleabilidad en I+D+i
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Formación
Convocatoria Contratos Predoctorales
Año convocatoria 2016
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Pro-environmental behavior, social norms, intrinsic motivation and external conditions

  • Silvi, Mariateresa|||0000-0003-2316-0210
  • Padilla, Emilio|||0000-0002-9510-8262
Pro-environmental behaviors (PEBs) have been linked in the literature to social norms, intrinsic motivation and external conditions. However, no study has jointly analyzed these factors on a cross-country dataset and given a holistic explanation of the variance observed in the adoption rates of PEBs across countries. Using a dataset measuring individual adoption of eight PEBs in the European Union's 28 member states (in 2018), we econometrically test these three groups of factors on a wider scale. We assess the importance of intrinsic motivation as a dominant factor and show how differing levels of intrinsic motivation influence the effectiveness of external conditions, such as monetary incentives and green infrastructures. The results suggest that two-pronged policies, which take into account intrinsic motivation and external conditions, are needed to reach a high observance rate in the population in the short and in the long term. The wider significance of these results for policy is discussed.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reversing impatience, framing mechanisms to increase the purchase of energy-saving appliances

  • Silvi, Mariateresa|||0000-0003-2316-0210
  • Padilla, Emilio|||0000-0002-9510-8262
Most environmental decisions involve intertemporal trade-offs, in that they require foregoing immediate gratification for the sake of future environmental quality. One such example is investing in energy efficiency, which entails an initial upfront cost in exchange for a future stream of energy and economic savings. Our experiment explores the role of individual temporal preferences in the decision to invest in energy conservation. We report results from a study on a nationally-representative sample of 2010 United States adults. Participants chose between appliances that differed solely in price and operating costs. We manipulated the salience of energy costs and primed participants with future-oriented messages. Our treatments increased energy-efficient choices by 24 percentage points compared with the status-quo scenario. Present-oriented individuals are less likely to purchase energy-efficient appliances but loss-framed messages that highlight the opportunity cost of inefficient appliances diminish the effect of impatience on refrigerators choice.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A tragedy of the horizons? An intertemporal perspective on public support for carbon taxes

  • Silvi, Mariateresa|||0000-0003-2316-0210
  • Padilla, Emilio|||0000-0002-9510-8262
Most collective dilemmas-that is, situations in which private interests contrast with collective interests-have an embedded intertemporal component in that they often imply that the rewards from defection are immediate but the rewards from cooperation are delayed and often accrue to people in the future. This also applies to carbon taxes since they imply additional individual costs for benefits which will mostly be enjoyed by future generations, which undermines their political support. In an experiment on a representative sample of 1000 United States adults, we presented individuals with twelve alternative carbon tax formulations with varying start dates, temporal horizons of carbon abatement objectives and revenue uses. We find that public support is highest when individuals can pre-commit to policies that start a few years into the future and for policies that express their emission cuts objectives in more distant and ambitious terms -i.e. achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 as opposed to halving emissions by 2030. Individual temporal discounting, exogenously measured, account for large part of these preferences. These preferences are in contrast with the most efficient policy, which is the one that starts immediately and distributes equitably mitigation costs across time. We find two ways to realign preferences with it. First, the most efficient policy becomes politically feasible when the tax includes a dividend that is redistributed to citizens. Delivering an economic compensation at the same time of the individual costs of the tax neutralizes the effect of individual discounting and of the policy's temporal context on tax support. Secondly, when the price of the carbon tax is adjusted upward to compensate for the opportunity cost of delaying its introduction, individuals start trading off its delay with avoidance of tax increases.