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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On value-attributions: semantics and beyond

  • Stojanovic, Isidora, 1973-
This paper is driven by the idea that the contextualism-relativism debate regarding the semantics of value-attributions turns upon certain extra-semantic assumptions that are unwarranted. One is the assumption that the many-place predicate of truth, deployed by compositional semantics, cannot be directly appealed to in theorizing/nabout people's assessments of truth value, but must be supplemented (if not replaced) by a different truth-predicate, obtained through certain "postsemantic" principles./nAnother is the assumption that semantics assigns to sentences not only truth values (as a function of various parameters, such as contexts, worlds and times), but also semantic contents/n, and that what context-sensitive expressions contribute to content/nare certain contextually determined elements. My first aim in this paper will be to show how the two assumptions have shaped two ways of understanding the debatebetween contextualism and relativism, as regards value-attributions. My second aim/nwill be to show that both assumptions belong outside semantics, and are moreover questionable., Partial funding from the following/nprojects: “Context, Content and Compositionality,” European Community’s Seventh Framework/nProgramme (FP7/2007–13), grant n° 229 441–CCC; “Perspectival Thoughts and Facts”/n(PETAF), EC-FP7/2007–13, grant n° 238 128; “Semantic Content and Context-Dependence,”/nMICINN, Spanish Government, grant n° CSD2009-0056.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Levels of explanation vindicated

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
  • Quesada, Daniel
Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson., This research has been partially funded by the MICINN, Spanish government, under the research project FFI2008-06164-C02-02, the CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 Program, grant CSD2009-0056, and the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC, SGR2009-1528.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Levels of explanation vindicated

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
  • Quesada, Daniel
Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson., This research has been partially funded by the MICINN, Spanish government, under the research project FFI2008-06164-C02-02, the CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 Program, grant CSD2009-0056, and the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC, SGR2009-1528.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On value-attributions: semantics and beyond

  • Stojanovic, Isidora, 1973-
This paper is driven by the idea that the contextualism-relativism debate regarding the semantics of value-attributions turns upon certain extra-semantic assumptions that are unwarranted. One is the assumption that the many-place predicate of truth, deployed by compositional semantics, cannot be directly appealed to in theorizing/nabout people's assessments of truth value, but must be supplemented (if not replaced) by a different truth-predicate, obtained through certain "postsemantic" principles./nAnother is the assumption that semantics assigns to sentences not only truth values (as a function of various parameters, such as contexts, worlds and times), but also semantic contents/n, and that what context-sensitive expressions contribute to content/nare certain contextually determined elements. My first aim in this paper will be to show how the two assumptions have shaped two ways of understanding the debatebetween contextualism and relativism, as regards value-attributions. My second aim/nwill be to show that both assumptions belong outside semantics, and are moreover questionable., Partial funding from the following/nprojects: “Context, Content and Compositionality,” European Community’s Seventh Framework/nProgramme (FP7/2007–13), grant n° 229 441–CCC; “Perspectival Thoughts and Facts”/n(PETAF), EC-FP7/2007–13, grant n° 238 128; “Semantic Content and Context-Dependence,”/nMICINN, Spanish Government, grant n° CSD2009-0056.