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REPARTOS JUSTOS E IMPLEMENTACION

ECO2008-03484-C02-01

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2008
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

  • Gómez Rúa, María
n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem., Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2008-03484-C02-01, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2011-23460
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share.We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The division problem with voluntary participation

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents shares. We study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents voluntary participation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Division Problem under Constraints

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.