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DECISIONES EFICIENTES EN MODELOS COMPLEJOS DE COOPERACION RESTRINGIDA: APLICACION A LA ELABORACION DE REGLAS DE REPARTO Y VOTACION EN LA UNION EUROPEA

ECO2010-17766

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2010
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

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On the existence and uniqueness of limit cycles in planar continuous piecewise linear systems without symmetry

  • Llibre, Jaume|||0000-0002-9511-5999
  • Ordóñez, Manuel
  • Ponce, Enrique|||0000-0003-0467-5032
Some techniques to show the existence and uniqueness of limit cycles, typically stated for smooth vector fields, are extended to continuous piecewise-linear differential systems. New results are obtained for systems with three linearity zones without symmetry and having one equilibrium point in the central region. We also revisit the case of systems with only two linear zones giving shorter proofs of known results.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A convex representation of totally balanced games

  • Bilbao, Jesús Mario|||0000-0001-7040-4009
  • Martínez Legaz, Juan Enrique|||0000-0002-6845-6202
We analyze the least increment function, a convex function of n variables associated to an n-person cooperative game. Another convex representation of cooperative games, the indirect function, has previously been studied. At every point the least increment function is greater than or equal to the indirect function, and both functions coincide in the case of convex games, but an example shows that they do not necessarily coincide if the game is totally balanced but not convex. We prove that the least increment function of a game contains all the information of the game if and only if the game is totally balanced. We also give necessary and sufficient conditions for a function to be the least increment function of a game as well as an expression for the core of a game in terms of its least increment function.