Pasar al contenido principal

MERCADOS FINANCIEROS Y LA MACROECONOMIA

ECO2011-23192

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2011
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Centro beneficiario CENTRE DE RECERCA EN ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stagnation traps

  • Benigno, Gianluca
  • Fornaro, Luca
We provide a Keynesian growth theory in which pessimistic expectations can lead to very persistent, or even permanent, slumps characterized by high unemployment and weak growth. We refer to these episodes as stagnation traps, because they consist in the joint occurrence of a liquidity and a growth trap. In a stagnation trap, the central bank is unable to restore full employment because weak growth depresses aggregate demand and pushes the policy rate against the zero lower bound, while growth is weak because low aggregate demand results in low profits, limiting firms’ investment in innovation. Aggressive policies aiming at restoring growth, such as subsidies to investment, can successfully lead the economy out of a stagnation trap by generating a regime shift in agents’ growth expectations., This research has been supported by the ESRC British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship grant ES/I024174/1, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant ECO2011-23192), the Fondation Banque de France Research Grant, the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

International debt deleveraging

  • Fornaro, Luca
This paper provides a framework to understand the adjustment triggered by an episode of debt deleveraging among financially integrated countries. During a period of international deleveraging, world consumption demand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save. If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can rely on depreciations to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associated with debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union this channel of adjustment is shut off, because deleveraging countries cannot depreciate against the other countries in the monetary union, and therefore the fall in the demand for consumption and the downward pressure on the interest rate are amplified. As a result, deleveraging in a monetary union can generate a liquidity trap and an aggregate recession. For instance, the model predicts that international deleveraging by peripheral euro area countries can account for around 24% of the output loss experienced by the euro area in the two years following the 2008 financial crisis., I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the French Ministere de l’Enseignement Sup ` erieur et de la Recherche, the ESRC, the Royal Economic Society, the Paul Woolley Centre, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant ECO2011-23192), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2014-54430-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR Grant 2014-SGR830), the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and the Juan de la Cierva Grant (FJCC-2015-02076)
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

  • Gennaioli, Nicola
  • Martin, Alberto, 1974-
  • Rossi, Stefano
This paper analyzes sovereign bondholdings by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign default episodes over 1998–2012, establishing two robust facts. First, banks hold many government bonds (on average 9% of assets) in normal times, particularly banks making fewer loans and operating in less financially-developed countries. Second, during default years, banks with the average exposure to government bonds exhibit a lower growth rate of loans than banks without bonds (7-percentage points lower). These results indicate that the “dangerous embrace” between banks and their government plays a key role during sovereign defaults and its strength depends on local conditions., Gennaioli thanks the European Research Council (grant ERC-GA 241114). Martin acknowledges support from the European Research Council (Consolidator Grant FP7-615651-MacroColl), the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant Ramon y Cajal RYC-2009-04624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity (grant ECO2011-23192), the Generalitat de Catalunya-AGAUR (grant 2009SGR1157), the Ramón Areces Grant and the IMF Research Fellowship.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: a tale of two frictions

  • Martin, Alberto, 1974-
  • Taddei, Filippo
The financial crisis of 2007–08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financial imperfections, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability. In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection: (i) leads to an increase in the economy's equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Under international financial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenous cycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show that limited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection., Martin acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant Ramon y Cajal RYC-2009-04624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity (grant ECO2011-23192), the Generalitat de Catalunya-AGAUR (grant 2009SGR1157) and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Taddei acknowledges financial support from Collegio Carlo Alberto through 2011 Research Grants.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: a tale of two frictions

  • Martin, Alberto, 1974-
  • Taddei, Filippo
The financial crisis of 2007–08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financial imperfections, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability. In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection: (i) leads to an increase in the economy's equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Under international financial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenous cycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show that limited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection., Martin acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant Ramon y Cajal RYC-2009-04624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity (grant ECO2011-23192), the Generalitat de Catalunya-AGAUR (grant 2009SGR1157) and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Taddei acknowledges financial support from Collegio Carlo Alberto through 2011 Research Grants.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stagnation traps

  • Benigno, Gianluca
  • Fornaro, Luca
We provide a Keynesian growth theory in which pessimistic expectations can lead to very persistent, or even permanent, slumps characterized by high unemployment and weak growth. We refer to these episodes as stagnation traps, because they consist in the joint occurrence of a liquidity and a growth trap. In a stagnation trap, the central bank is unable to restore full employment because weak growth depresses aggregate demand and pushes the policy rate against the zero lower bound, while growth is weak because low aggregate demand results in low profits, limiting firms’ investment in innovation. Aggressive policies aiming at restoring growth, such as subsidies to investment, can successfully lead the economy out of a stagnation trap by generating a regime shift in agents’ growth expectations., This research has been supported by the ESRC British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship grant ES/I024174/1, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant ECO2011-23192), the Fondation Banque de France Research Grant, the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

International debt deleveraging

  • Fornaro, Luca
This paper provides a framework to understand the adjustment triggered by an episode of debt deleveraging among financially integrated countries. During a period of international deleveraging, world consumption demand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save. If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can rely on depreciations to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associated with debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union this channel of adjustment is shut off, because deleveraging countries cannot depreciate against the other countries in the monetary union, and therefore the fall in the demand for consumption and the downward pressure on the interest rate are amplified. As a result, deleveraging in a monetary union can generate a liquidity trap and an aggregate recession. For instance, the model predicts that international deleveraging by peripheral euro area countries can account for around 24% of the output loss experienced by the euro area in the two years following the 2008 financial crisis., I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the French Ministere de l’Enseignement Sup ` erieur et de la Recherche, the ESRC, the Royal Economic Society, the Paul Woolley Centre, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant ECO2011-23192), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2014-54430-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR Grant 2014-SGR830), the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and the Juan de la Cierva Grant (FJCC-2015-02076)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

  • Gennaioli, Nicola
  • Martin, Alberto, 1974-
  • Rossi, Stefano
This paper analyzes sovereign bondholdings by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign default episodes over 1998–2012, establishing two robust facts. First, banks hold many government bonds (on average 9% of assets) in normal times, particularly banks making fewer loans and operating in less financially-developed countries. Second, during default years, banks with the average exposure to government bonds exhibit a lower growth rate of loans than banks without bonds (7-percentage points lower). These results indicate that the “dangerous embrace” between banks and their government plays a key role during sovereign defaults and its strength depends on local conditions., Gennaioli thanks the European Research Council (grant ERC-GA 241114). Martin acknowledges support from the European Research Council (Consolidator Grant FP7-615651-MacroColl), the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant Ramon y Cajal RYC-2009-04624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity (grant ECO2011-23192), the Generalitat de Catalunya-AGAUR (grant 2009SGR1157), the Ramón Areces Grant and the IMF Research Fellowship.