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VARIABLES FUNDAMENTALES Y DIFERENCIALES TIPOS DE INTERES EN EL AREA EURO

ECO2012-34595

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2012
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Systemic risk and asymmetric responses in the financial industry

  • López Espinosa, Germán
  • Moreno, Antonio
  • Rubia, Antonio
  • Valderrama, Laura
  • Rubia, Antonio|||/items/f291d530-2ead-4088-b225-cce46984077c
To date, an operational measure of systemic risk capturing nonlinear tail-comovements between system-wide and individual bank returns has not yet been developed. This paper proposes an extension of the CoVaR methodology in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) to capture the asymmetric response of the banking system to positive and negative shocks to the market-valued balance sheets of individual banks. Building on a comprehensive sample of U.S. banks in the period 1990–2010, the evidence in this paper shows that ignoring asymmetries that feature tail-interdependences may lead to a severe underestimation of systemic risk. On average, the relative impact on the system of a fall in individual market value is sevenfold that of an increase. Moreover, the downward bias in systemic-risk measuring from ignoring this asymmetric pattern increases with bank size. In particular, the conditional tail-comovement between the banking system and a bank that is losing market value belonging to the top size-sorted decile is nearly 5.5 times larger than the unconditional tail-comovement versus 3.3 times for banks in the bottom decile. The asymmetric model also produces much better fitting, with the restriction that gives rise to the standard symmetric model being rejected for most firms in the sample, particularly, in the segment of large-scale banks. This result is important from a regulatory and supervisory perspective, since the asymmetric generalization enhances the capacity to monitor systemic interdependences.