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AGREGACION Y CONTABILIZACION DE BIENES PUBLICOS AMBIENTALES

ECO2012-35432

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2012
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

AGREGACION Y CONTABILIZACION DE BIENES PUBLICOS AMBIENTALES

ECO2012-35432

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2012
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements

  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
This article surveys game theoretic papers focused on the negotiation process that leads to an International Environmental Agreement. Most of the papers considered apply bargaining theory, although other approaches have been considered as well. Among other issues, the papers considered analyze: the burden sharing rule that will result from a negotiation over a global public good; the role of information asymmetries; the impact of unilateral commitments, delegation, and ratification; whether or not countries are going to form groups during the negotiation process; and the influence of the expectation of a future bargaining process on investment decisions. The basic bargaining model is optimistic, as it predicts that countries will reach an efficient agreement immediately. However, all the developments of this model surveyed afterwards are rather pessimistic and even the basic model has perverse incentives for pre-negotiation signals., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dynamic Relative Standards versus Emission Taxes in a Putty-Clay Model

  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
  • Just, Richard E.
  • Zilberman, David
The paper derives the dynamics of pollution taxes and relative standards—which set bounds on emissions per unit of output—and the resulting optimal replacement of capital goods in a vintage model under the putty-clay assumption. Comparing policies that are constrained by the same aggregate pollution target level, the productive life of capital is longer under dynamic relative standards, as the variable cost of pollution imposed on aging capital is lower. As a result, the absolute level of output from the industry is generally higher under dynamic relative standards than under taxes. The results also show, under reasonable assumptions, that the pollution goal will be achieved using cleaner technologies under dynamic relative standards. These results can explain, from a political economy perspective, the prevalence of dynamic relative standards in regulations., Research leading to this article was paid by the USDAFAS-TASC_CDPB grant on methyl bromide alternatives., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Testing convergent validity in choice experiments: Application to public recreation in Spanish stone pine and cork oak forests

  • Oviedo Pro, José Luis
  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
  • Ruiz Gauna, Itziar
  • Campos Palacín, Pablo
We perform two convergent validity tests in a choice experiment applied to public recreation in Spanish stone pine and cork oak forests. Results show convergent validity between a choice and a ranking recoded as a choice format in an experiment with three alternatives plus status quo. We also find significant differences between two payment vehicles (increased trip expenditures and entrance fee) that are included simultaneously in the choice sets. We estimate aggregated recreation values using compensating variation and simulated exchange value (maximum benefits from a potential market) measures. The latter measures account for 35–51% of the former values., This research was supported by INIA (grant number CPE03-001-C5) and by the National R&D Plan of the Spanish Government (DYNOPAGROF (grant number SEJ2005-05085/ECCON), ACBPA (grant number ECO2012-35432) and VEABA (grant number ECO2013-42110) projects). Itziar Ruiz-Gauna Ph.D's contract is funded by the Programa Predoctoral de Formación de Personal Investigador No Doctor provided by the Basque Regional Government., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Paris Agreement as a step backward to gain momentum: Lessons from and for theory, L’Accord de Paris comme un pas en arrière pour un nouvel élan: Les leçons à tirer de et pour la théorie

  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
[EN] The Paris Agreement has moved us backward from a world where binding burdensharing agreements like the Kyoto Protocol were the standard, to a world where climate policy is reduced to pledge and review. Nevertheless, this has allowed climate policy to gain new momentum. This paper argues that game theoretical analyses of International Environmental Agreements have not incorporated this change yet, as they were all designed to analyze burden sharing agreements, or agreements where signatories essentially become one player. Despite this fact, some relevant insights from this literature are still relevant to guiding future climate policy in the new context., [FR] L’Accord de Paris nous a déplacé d’un monde où les accords fermes de partage du fardeau, comme pour le Protocole de Kyoto, étaient standards à un monde où la politique climatique se réduit à l’engagement et le réajustement. Cela a néanmoins permis de donner un nouvel élan à la politique climatique. Dans ce papier nous soutenons que les approches en termes de jeux n’ont pas encore intégré ce changement dans la mesure où elles ont été conçues pour analyser les accords sur le partage du fardeau, ou encore les accords où les signataires finissent par ne faire qu’un. Malgré cela, certains éléments marquants de cette littérature conserve toute leur pertinence pour guider la politique climatique future dans ce nouveau contexte., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Are forest landowners ready for woody energy crops? Preferences for afforestation programs in Southern Spain

  • Soliño, Mario
  • Oviedo Pro, José Luis
  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
Landowners' attitudes towards energy crops are a keystone for the fulfillment of the European Union objectives of energy production (electrical, thermal and biofuels) from biomass in the next years. Economic instruments play a fundamental role to increase the participation of the landowners in renewable energy schemes. A discrete choice experiment was conducted using a mail survey to 268 private forest landowners from the Andalusia region (southern Spain). The aim was to examine forest landowners' willingness to implement afforestation schemes considering short rotation plantations based on woody energy crops (eucalyptus, paulownia and poplar) and traditional tree species (holm oak and pine). Results show that afforestation with holm oak is the preferred alternative followed by woody energy crops. According to the experiment results, the participation of about half of the Andalusian forest owners in a woody energy crops scheme would imply a public expenditure in incentives for this land use change of 265 million of euros, i.e. an unrealistic figure given the current institutional framework for renewables in Europe. Finally, it is shown that compensations to forest landowners are affected by the payment timeframe and that the discount rate implicitly used by landowners exceeds the 4% rate commonly used in forest economics literature., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change

  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
  • Pereau, Jean-Christophe
We discuss a model of gradual coalition formation with positive externalities in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to negotiate multilaterally or sequentially over climate change. We show that the leader may choose a sequential path, and that the choice is determined by the convexity of the TU-game and the free-rider payoffs of the followers. Except in a few clearly defined cases, the outcome of the negotiation process is always the grand coalition, although the process may need some time. This holds for the standard IEA game with heterogeneous players even if the grand coalition is not stable in a multilateral context. We also analyse the role of a facilitating agency. The agency has an incentive to speed up intra-stage negotiations and to extend the period between negotiation stages in a sequential process., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Simulated exchange values and ecosystem accounting: Theory and application to free access recreation

  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
  • Oviedo Pro, José Luis
  • Campos Palacín, Pablo
This paper discusses the Simulated Exchange Value method, a practical method to estimate values for goods and services currently outside of the market in a manner consistent with the market-based figures considered in national accounts. The method proposes to simulate, in a partial equilibrium context, the price that would occur if a good or service outside of the market, such as free access recreation in forests, were internalized. The method takes into account the demand, estimated using non-market valuation techniques, the supply and the market structure. The discussion covers the case of a linear demand and the case in which the demand is estimated using discrete choice methods. This paper applies the method to free access recreation in the forests of Andalusia, in the south of Spain, and compares the results to those obtained using Hicksian variations., The authors thank the Junta de Andalucía and the Agencia de Agua y Medio Ambiente de Andalucía for the support received through the RECAMAN (Forest income and capital accounting) project (contract NET165602). Alejandro Caparrós also benefited from the project ACBPA (ECO2012-35432), which was funded by MINECO (Spain), Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology

  • Caparrós Gass, Alejandro
  • Finus, Michael
We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology. Whereas policy coordination is not necessary for symmetric players, it matters for asymmetric players; however, this fails in the absence of transfers. By contrast, with a transfer scheme, asymmetry may be an asset for cooperation. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of self‐enforcing agreements. Asymmetric distributions of autarky public good provision levels (also representing asymmetric interests in cooperation) that are positively skewed tend to be conducive to the stability of agreements. We show that under such conditions, even a coalition including all players can be stable. However, asymmetries that foster stability (instability) tend to be associated with low (high) gains from cooperation., University of Bath, Grant/Award Number:Global Mobility Scheme (VB-EC3BMF), Peer reviewed