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EFICIENCIA, REPARTO, EQUIDAD Y SOLIDARIDAD

ECO2013-43119-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2013
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 9
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RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Cost sharing solutions defined by non-negative eigenvectors

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Silva Reus, José Ángel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
The problem of sharing a cost M among n individuals, identified by some characteristic ci∈R+,ci∈R+, appears in many real situations. Two important proposals on how to share the cost are the egalitarian and the proportional solutions. In different situations a combination of both distributions provides an interesting approach to the cost sharing problem. In this paper we obtain a family of (compromise) solutions associated to the Perron’s eigenvectors of Levinger’s transformations of a characteristics matrix A. This family includes both the egalitarian and proportional solutions, as well as a set of suitable intermediate proposals, which we analyze in some specific contexts, as claims problems and inventory cost games.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Folk solution for simple minimum cost spanning tree problems

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes how to efficiently connect a group of individuals to a source. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the addressed question is how to allocate the total cost among the involved agents. One prominent solution in allocating this minimum cost is the so-called Folk solution. Unfortunately, in general, the Folk solution is not easy to compute. We identify a class of mcst problems in which the Folk solution is obtained in an easy way. This class includes elementary cost mcst problems.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Dual sourcing with price discovery

  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Dahm, Matthias
  • Alcalde, Jose|||/items/d21b8ab0-26c7-49da-a3bb-f2668a1574ac
We consider a (standard) reverse auction for dual sourcing and propose to determine both the providers' shares and the reserve price endogenously, depending on the suppliers' bids. Our benchmark considers a two-stage game of complete information. After a first round of bidding, the two most competitive suppliers advance to the second stage and compete again with a refined reserve price, which is based on the lowest price of the excluded providers. We show that at the first stage providers reveal their costs truthfully. At the second stage suppliers balance a trade-off between increasing their share and raising their mark up. Surprisingly, when discarded suppliers are competitive enough, the procedure not only allows taking advantage of dual sourcing but also generates lower procurement expenditures than a standard auction for sole sourcing. We also consider extensions of the benchmark model, including to situations in which providers have private information about their costs.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Strategic sharing of a costly network

  • Hernández, Penélope
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Silva Reus, José Ángel
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algorithm provides a way of finding the minimum cost tree mm. This has led to several definitions in the literature, regarding how to distribute the cost. These rules propose different cost allocations, which can be understood as compensations and/or payments between players, with respect to the status quo point: each user pays for the connection she uses to be linked to the source. In this paper we analyze the rationale behind a distribution of the minimum cost by defining an a priori transfer structure. Our first result states the existence of a transfer structure such that no user is willing to choose a different tree from the minimum cost tree. Moreover, given a transfer structure, we implement the above solution as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a game where players decide sequentially with whom to connect. Finally, we obtain that the existence of a transfer structure supporting an allocation characterizes the core of the monotone cooperative game associated with a minimum cost spanning tree problem. This transfer structure is called social transfer structure. Therefore, the minimum cost spanning tree emerges as both a social and individual solution.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Beyond the Spanish MIR with Consent: (Hidden) Cooperation and Coordination in Matching

  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Alcalde, Jose|||/items/d21b8ab0-26c7-49da-a3bb-f2668a1574ac
Sequential mechanisms to solve matching problems are useful to promote (hidden) cooperation between agents. Taking as a starting point the MIRC mechanism, employed in Spain to match medical students and residency programs in privately owned hospitals, we find that: (1) In the current system, where the number of students that each program might enroll is limited, the unique equilibrium allocation can be unstable. (2) When the above limit is not (formally) imposed, instability is not expected to occur. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of equilibria shows that coordination failure might emerge, generating a social welfare loss. (3) When the role of students and hospitals is reversed in the MIRC mechanism, (hidden) cooperation is guaranteed. Moreover, coordination failure disappears.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Facts and Misconceptions about 2D:4D, Social and Risk Preferences

  • Alonso, Judit
  • Di Paolo, Roberto
  • Ponti, Giovanni
  • Sartarelli, Marcello
  • Ponti, Giovanni|||/items/ef055331-2045-4ba3-9308-61994c6a83ab
We study how the ratio between the length of the second and fourth digit (2D:4D) correlates with choices in social and risk preferences elicitation tasks by building a large dataset from five experimental projects with more than 800 subjects. Our results confirm the recent literature that downplays the link between 2D:4D and many domains of economic interest, such as social and risk preferences. As for the former, we find that social preferences are significantly lower when 2D:4D is above the median value only for subjects with low cognitive ability. As for the latter, we find that a high 2D:4D is not correlated with the frequency of subjects' risky choices.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

The dynamics of political party support and egocentric economic evaluations: The Scottish case

  • Chrysanthou, Georgios Marios
  • Guillo, Maria Dolores
  • Guillo, Maria Dolores|||/items/3b0dca42-a6a8-45b3-a309-097c6ec928f5
We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party (SNP) support using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) during 1999–06. We study the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the effects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic evaluations constitute an important determinant of SNP support over the entire period, being this effect stronger among the male electorate. The results are consistent with the electors holding the incumbent Labour Party accountable for their personal financial situation, though financial security augments the nationalist propensity among partisan voters. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations form a significant determinant of incumbent Labour Party support in both the 1999–02 and 2003–06 intervening electoral cycles.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of representatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to represent all of voters in at least the same proportion. This property is a way of selecting a committee that represents completely all of voters when such a committee exists. The usual voting rules in this context do not satisfy this condition.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Participation and Solidarity in Redistribution Mechanisms

  • Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different characteristics: skills and effort. Luttens (2010) introduces claims that individuals have over aggregate income and that only depend on the effort they exert. Moreover, he proposes redistribution mechanisms in which solidarity is based on changes in a lower bound on what every individual deserves according to these claims: the so-called minimal rights (O’Neill 1982). A debatable consequence in one of Luttens’ mechanisms is that “the poorest individuals might up with a negative income” (Luttens 2010); that is, this mechanism does not satisfy participation, which turns out to be incompatible with claims feasibility, under Luttens’ assumptions. We present a new solidarity axiom that is compatible both with participation and claims feasibility, and we provide a mechanism satisfying these properties and our new additive solidarity axiom. Moreover, our mechanism satisfies additional properties, as priority, or respect of minimal rights.