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CARACTERISTICAS INDIVIDUALES, PREFERENCIAS Y BIENESTAR, ASIGNACIONES EFICIENTES

ECO2013-44879-R

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D+i Retos de Investigación
Año convocatoria 2013
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Molis Bañales, Elena
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions., Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the project ECO2012–34202 and Fundación Ramón Areces. María Gómez-Rúa acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the project ECO2011-23460 and the Galician Government through the project 2013XGCEDU08072013EMER. Elena Molis acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the projects ECO2012–31346 and ECO2013–44879–R, from the Consejería de Economía, Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo, Junta de Andalucía through the projects SEJ–492 and SEJ–1436 and from the Basque Government through the project IT568–13.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: theory and experimental evidence

  • Benito Ostolaza, Juan Miguel
  • Brañas Garza, Pablo
  • Hernández, Penélope
  • Sanchis Llopis, Juan A.
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies notably decreases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects., Financial support from the Spanish Economy and Competitiveness Ministry (ECO2014-55745-R, ECO2013-46550-R, ECO2013-44879-R, SEJ-2012-1436, ECO2012-34202), Fundación BBVA, Junta de Andalucía Excelencia (P07-SEJ-02547) and Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/054) is gratefully acknowledged.