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DATA CONDUCTAL Y BIOLOGICO DEL LABORATORY Y DEL COMPO EN EL MUNDO COMPLEJO Y SIMPLE

ECO2014-56154-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The power of requests in a redistribution game: an experimental study

  • Pedersini, Riccardo
  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Le Menestrel, Marc
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase., R.N.’s and M.L.M.’s grants SEJ2005-08391, ECO2014-56154-P of the Spanish Ministry of Education.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Time scarcity and the market for news

  • Alaoui, Larbi
  • Germano, Fabrizio
We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. Time-constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets. They choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip, thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet. Firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We show that even when readers (or television viewers) and firms are rational and unbiased, they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer. In particular, relevant news items may be crowded out. We then study how reader-efficient standards can be restored, and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media. These include tabloidization and polarization of the news, and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media, including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout., The authors acknowledge financial support from the Fundación BBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under grant RYC-2016-21127 (Alaoui), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project grants ECO2014-56154-P and PGC2018-098949-B-I00 (Alaoui) and ECO2017-89240-P (Germano), as well as through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The power of requests in a redistribution game: an experimental study

  • Pedersini, Riccardo
  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Le Menestrel, Marc
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase., R.N.’s and M.L.M.’s grants SEJ2005-08391, ECO2014-56154-P of the Spanish Ministry of Education.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Time scarcity and the market for news

  • Alaoui, Larbi
  • Germano, Fabrizio
We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. Time-constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets. They choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip, thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet. Firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We show that even when readers (or television viewers) and firms are rational and unbiased, they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer. In particular, relevant news items may be crowded out. We then study how reader-efficient standards can be restored, and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media. These include tabloidization and polarization of the news, and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media, including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout., The authors acknowledge financial support from the Fundación BBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under grant RYC-2016-21127 (Alaoui), and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project grants ECO2014-56154-P and PGC2018-098949-B-I00 (Alaoui) and ECO2017-89240-P (Germano), as well as through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D, grant SEV-2015-0563.