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CAMBIOS SOCIALES Y ECONOMICOS EN LAS ORGANIZACIONES Y LOS MERCADOS. EVOLUCION Y PERSISTENCIA DE LA CULTURA Y LAS INSTITUCIONES

ECO2014-58297-R

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D+i Retos de Investigación
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences

  • Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael
  • Ponti, Giovanni
  • Ponti, Giovanni|||/items/ef055331-2045-4ba3-9308-61994c6a83ab
We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when they know about the decisions of their matched partners (social influence). We also perform a structural estimation exercise to control for heterogeneity in risk attitudes. As for individual behavior, our estimates confirm previous studies in that high risk aversion is associated with low discounting. As for social behavior, we find that social motives outweigh social influence, especially when we restrict our sample to pairs of Dictators and Recipients who satisfy minimal consistency conditions.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cultural transmission and persistence of entrepreneurship

  • Olcina, G.
  • Tur, Elena M.
  • Escriche, L.
This paper contributes to explain the persistence of differences in levels of entrepreneurship within and across countries. We provide an explanation based on the dynamic interplay between purposeful intergenerational transmission of preferences for entrepreneurship and public administration efficiency. Individuals vote on taxes, and the collected taxes fund the civil servants’ wages. The performance of the administration generating an efficient normative and regulatory environment, affects the success of entrepreneurship. We show that an economy can reach two different long-run equilibria: a traditional equilibrium, with a low proportion of entrepreneurs, high taxes and an inefficient administration and, an entrepreneurial equilibrium with a high proportion of entrepreneurs and, lower taxes but enough to implement an efficient administration. The equilibrium achieved depends on the tax policy followed by the different generations. If decisions are made by majority voting in a myopic way, then the initial conditions of the society become crucial. This result explains persistence: an economy evolves around similar levels of entrepreneurship unless some reforms are implemented., G. Olcina and L. Escriche acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness project, ECO-2014-58297-R, ECO-2017-87245-R and the ERC project-TECTACOM. E.M. Tur thanks the Broman Foundation for financial support., Peer reviewed