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CONFLICTO E INFLUENCIA ESTRATEGICA: LOS EFECTOS DE LAS ACTIVIDADES DE CAPTACION DE RENTAS EN LAS DECISIONES COLECTIVAS

ECO2015-67901-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2015
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS ISLAS BALEARES
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market

  • Escrihuela Villar, Marc
  • Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
  • Vicente-Pérez, José
  • Vicente-Pérez, José|||/items/7fad998a-2853-4a32-852d-d0c16df35750
In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.