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DISEÑO DE INSTITUTIONES ECONOMICAS EN UNA ECONOMIA GLOBAL

ECO2016-75410-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2016
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

  • Bannikova, Marina
  • Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline-a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems

  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Solís-Baltodano, María-José
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The notion of lower bound on awards has been introduced in the literature to analyze the establishment of guarantees that ensure a minimum award to each agent involved in situations of conflicting claims, such as the rationing of a resource or the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Indeed, this concept has a core role in many approaches related to the problem of fair allocation (Thomson in Math Soc Sci 74:41–59, 2015) and a range of such lower bounds have been proposed: the minimal right (Curiel et al. in Z Oper Res 31:A143–A159, 1987), the fair bound (Moulin in Handb Soc Choice Welf 1:289–357, 2002), securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar in Math Soc Sci 47(2):245–257, 2004) and the min bound (Dominguez in mimeo, 2006). In this context, the key contribution of the current paper is to show that there is a correspondence between lower bounds and rules; i.e., associated to each particular lower bound, we find a specific way of distributing the resources. In doing so, we provide new characterizations for two well known rules, the constrained equal awards and Ibn Ezra’s rules. A dual analysis, by using upper bounds on awards will provide characterizations of the dual of the previously mentioned rules: the constrained equal losses rule and the dual of Ibn Ezra’s rule.