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LA LA SOLIDARIDAD COMO MOTOR DEL CRECIMIENTO ECONOMICO

ECO2016-75631-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2016
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE SALAMANCA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Modeling asset returns under time-varying semi-nonparametric distributions

  • León Valle, Ángel M.
  • Ñíguez, Trino-Manuel
  • León Valle, Ángel M.|||/items/764769ef-60cf-4dda-a7bd-d42395be3add
We extend the semi-nonparametric (SNP) density of León et al. (2009) to time-varying higher-order moments for daily asset return innovations of stock indexes and foreign-exchange rates. We estimate robust tail-indexes for testing the existence of the unconditional higher-order moments. We obtain closed-form expressions of partial moments and expected shortfall under the time-varying SNP density with the GJR-GARCH for modeling returns. A comparative study between SNP and Hansen’s skewed-t, based on skewness-kurtosis frontiers, in-sample and backtesting analyses, is also implemented. Finally, we conduct an out-of-sample portfolio selection exercise for the stocks of the S&P 100 index through an equity screening method based on our parametric one-sided reward/risk performance measures and compare with the Sharpe ratio portfolio.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal incentives on multiple prosocial activities when reputation matters

  • Candel Sánchez, Francisco
  • Perote-Peña, Juan
In this paper, we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially beneficial but costly activities in order to convey information about their willingness to cooperate with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary compensations in any one of them affects the relative costs of undertaking each activity and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We find the subsidies that maximize social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the effects on optimal subsidies of changes in their determinants.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Incentives for prosocial behavior under reputation persistence and policy lags

  • Candel-Sánchez, Francisco
  • Perote-Peña, Juan
In this paper we show that a policy based on incentives to promote prosocial activities can be counterproductive in a context where the agents’ reputation exhibits persistence over time and there exists a time lag between announcement of the policy and implementation. Reputation persistence in our model means that the reputation gained in past periods constrains the possibilities of changing reputation in the future. We present a two-period model in which agents use prosocial activities to signal their degree of altruism. If a subsidy is established for the second period, the set of agents that undertake social activities in that period enlarges. This worsens the reputation of the most altruistic agents, some of whom then react by decreasing their involvement in prosocial activities in the first period. We identify a condition under which subsidies cause a decrease in the global supply of pro-social activities.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How does corporate altruism affect oligopolistic competition?

  • Candel-Sánchez, Francisco
  • Perote-Peña, Juan
This paper examines firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) competition in a duopoly model with product differentiation. Firms exhibit different degrees of altruism, which is a characteristic positively valued by consumers; however, as each firm's degree of altruism (type) is private information, using CSR activities to signal the types becomes an additional tool for competition. We analyze a game where firms first signal about their types and then compete in standard price competition. Consumers observe the firms' CSR activities and infer their degree of altruism. Firms then simultaneously set prices, and consumers purchase goods from one firm or the other. In equilibrium, CSR is determined by the consumers' valuation of corporate altruism and the degree of product differentiation. The model examines the interaction between these two determinants, finding that more competition in the market (less product differentiation) might be detrimental to CSR when consumers' concern about firms' altruism is high enough.