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Sistemas Complejos Socio-Tecnológicos

FJCI-2016-28276

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Promoción del Talento y su Empleabilidad en I+D+i
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Formación
Convocatoria Juan de la Cierva Formación
Año convocatoria 2016
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Framing in multiple public goods games and donation to charities

  • Cardoso, Felipe Maciel
  • Meloni, Sandro
  • Gracia-Lázaro, C.
  • Antonioni, A.
  • Cuesta, José A.
  • Sánchez, Ángel
  • Moreno, Yamir
The vast amount of research devoted to public goods games has shown that contributions may be dramatically affected by varying framing conditions. This is particularly relevant in the context of donations to charities and non-governmental organizations. Here, we design a multiple public goods experiment by introducing five types of funds, each differing in the fraction of the contribution that is donated to a charity. We found that people contribute more to public goods when the associated social donations are presented as indirect rather than as direct donations. At the same time, the fraction of the donations devoted to charity is not affected by the framing. We have also found that, on average, women contribute to public goods and donate to charity significantly more than men. These findings are of potential interest to the design of social investment tools, in particular for charities to ask for better institutional designs from policy makers., This work was partially supported by MINECO (Spain) and FEDER funds through grant no. FIS2017-87519-P (Y.M.) and FJCI-2016-28276 (A.A.); by Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades/FEDER (Spain/UE) through grant no. PGC2018-098186-B-I00 (BASIC) (A.S. and J.C.); by Comunidad de Madrid under grant no. PRACTICO-CM and by Comunidad de Madrid/Universidad Carlos III de Madrid under grant no. CAVTIONS-CM-UC3M (A.S.); by Comunidad de Aragón (Spain) through grant no. E36-20R to FENOL (C.G.L. and Y.M.); by the EU through FET-Proactive Project MULTIPLEX (contract no. 317532, Y.M.) and FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, C.G.L., Y.M. and A.S.), and by the Spanish State Research Agency and FEDER funds, through the María de Maeztu Program for Units of Excellence in R&D (MDM-2017-0711, S.M.) and under the PACSS grant no. (RTI2018-093732-B-C22, S.M.)., Peer reviewed
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game

  • Giardini, Francesca
  • Vilone, Daniele
  • Sanchez, Ángel
  • Antonioni, Alberto
When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ''The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling''.