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INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBALIZATION

JCI-2010-08414

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Contratación e Incorporación de RRHH
Subprograma Subprograma Juan de la Cierva (JDC)
Convocatoria Juan de la Cierva Incorporación
Año convocatoria 2010
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Formación e Incorporación de Investigadores
Centro beneficiario CENTRE DE RECERCA EN ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Political centralization and government accountability

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Piolatto, Amedeo
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions., Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Political centralization and government accountability

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Piolatto, Amedeo
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions., Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.