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RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
Production-Inventory settings with heterogeneous agents appear frequently in the study of supply chain management. For instance, there are Production-Inventory situations in which certain agents are essential as they can reduce the costs of other agents (followers) when they cooperate with each other. The study of such a cooperation can be modelled by means of a cooperative game and studied finding fair cost allocations. These class of cooperative games was introduced in Guardiola et al. (in Games Econ Behav 65:205–219, 2009) where it was also proposed the Owen point. This cost allocation is an appealing solution concept that for Production-Inventory games (PI-games) is always stable, in the sense of the core. The Owen point allows all the players in the game to operate at minimum cost but it does not take into account the cost reduction induced by essential players over their followers. Thus, it may be seen as an altruistic allocation for essential players what can be criticized. The aim of this paper is two-fold: to introduce new core allocations for PI-games improving the weaknesses of the Owen point and to study the structure and complexity of set of stable cost allocations (the core) of PI-games.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Unitary Owen Points in Cooperative Lot-Sizing Models with Backlogging

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
This paper analyzes cost sharing in uncapacitated lot-sizing models with backlogging and heterogeneous costs. It is assumed that several firms participate in a consortium aiming at satisfying their demand over the planning horizon with minimal operating cost. Each individual firm has its own ordering channel and holding technology, but cooperation with other firms consists in sharing that information. Therefore, the firms that cooperate can use the best ordering channels and holding technology among members of the consortium. This mode of cooperation is stable. in that allocations of the overall operating cost exist, so that no group of agents benefit from leaving the consortium. Our contribution in the current paper is to present a new family of cost sharing allocations with good properties for enforcing cooperation: the unitary Owen points. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the unitary Owen points to belong to the core of the cooperative game. In addition, we provide empirical evidence, through simulation, showing that, in randomly-generated situations, the above condition is fulfilled in 99% of the cases. Additionally, a relationship between lot-sizing games and a certain family of production-inventory games, through Owen’s points of the latter, is described. This interesting relationship enables easily constructing a variety of coalitionally stable allocations for cooperative lot-sizing models.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

The effect of consolidated periods in heterogeneous lot-sizing games

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of cooperation works as follows: ordering channels and holding and backlogging technologies are shared among the members of the coalitions. This implies that each firm uses the best ordering channel and holding technology provided by the participants in the consortium. That is, they produce, hold inventory, pay backlogged demand and make orders at the minimum cost of the coalition members. Thus, firms aim at satisfying their demand over the planing horizon with minimal operation cost. Our contribution is to show that there exist fair allocations of the overall operation cost among the firms so that no group of agents profit from leaving the consortium. Then we propose a parametric family of cost allocations and provide sufficient conditions for this to be a stable family against coalitional defections of firms. Finally, we focus on those periods of the time horizon that are consolidated and we analyze their effect on the stability of cost allocations.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the multisource hyperplanes location problem to fitting set of points

  • Blanco, V.
  • Japón, A.
  • Ponce, D.
  • Puerto, J.
In this paper we study the problem of locating a given number of hyperplanes minimizing an objective function of the closest distances from a set of points. We propose a general framework for the problem in which norm-based distances between points and hyperplanes are aggregated by means of ordered median functions. A compact Mixed Integer Linear (or Non Linear) programming formulation is presented for the problem and also an extended set partitioning formulation with a huge number of variables is derived. We develop a column generation procedure embedded within a branch-and-price algorithm for solving the problem by adequately performing its preprocessing, pricing and branching. We also analyze geometrically the optimal solutions of the problem, deriving properties which are exploited to generate initial solutions for the proposed algorithms. Finally, the results of an extensive computational experience are reported. The issue of scalability is also addressed showing theoretical upper bounds on the errors assumed by replacing the original datasets by aggregated versions.