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Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Vector-borne epidemics driven by human mobility

  • Soriano-Paños, D.
  • Arias-Castro, J.H.
  • Reyna-Lara, A.
  • Martinez, H.J.
  • Meloni, S.
  • Gomez-Gardeñes, J.
Vector-borne epidemics are progressively becoming a global burden, especially those related to flaviviruses, and the effects of different factors such as climate change or the increase of human mobility can sensibly increase the population at risk worldwide. Such outbreaks are the result of the combination of different factors including crossed contagions between humans and vectors, their demographic distribution and human mobility among others. The current availability of information about all those ingredients demands their incorporation into current mathematical models for vector-borne disease transmission. Here, relying on a Markovian formulation of the metapopulation dynamics, we propose a framework that explicitly includes human-vector interactions, mobility, and demography. The analysis of the framework allows us not only to derive an expression of the epidemic threshold capturing the conditions for the onset of the epidemics but also to highlight some unseen features of vector-borne epidemics, such as abrupt changes in the unfolding patterns of the disease for small variations of the degree of mobility. Finally, driven by these insights, we obtain a prevalence indicator to rank populations according to their risk of being affected by a vector-borne disease. We illustrate the utility of this indicator by reproducing the spatial distribution Dengue cases reported in the city of Santiago de Cali (Colombia) from 2015 to 2016.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Network coevolution drives segregation and enhances Pareto optimal equilibrium selection in coordination games

  • González Casado, M. A.
  • Sánchez, Á.
  • San Miguel, M.
In this work we assess the role played by the dynamical adaptation of the interactions network, among agents playing Coordination Games, in reaching global coordination and in the equilibrium selection. Specifically, we analyze a coevolution model that couples the changes in agents’ actions with the network dynamics, so that while agents play the game, they are able to sever some of their current connections and connect with others. We focus on two action update rules: Replicator Dynamics (RD) and Unconditional Imitation (UI), and we define a coevolution rule in which, apart from action updates, with a certain rewiring probability p, agents unsatisfied with their current connections are able to eliminate a link and connect with a randomly chosen neighbor. We call this probability to rewire links the ‘network plasticity’. We investigate a Pure Coordination Game (PCG), in which choices are equivalent, and on a General Coordination Game (GCG), for which there is a risk-dominant action and a payoff-dominant one. Changing the plasticity parameter, there is a transition from a regime in which the system fully coordinates on a single connected component to a regime in which the system fragments in two connected components, each one coordinated on a different action (either if both actions are equivalent or not). The nature of this fragmentation transition is different for different update rules. Second, we find that both for RD and UI in a GCG, there is a regime of intermediate values of plasticity, before the fragmentation transition, for which the system is able to fully coordinate on a single component network on the payoff-dominant action, i.e., coevolution enhances payoff-dominant equilibrium selection for both update rules.
Zaguán. Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Zaragoza
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Framing in multiple public goods games and donation to charities

  • Maciel Cardoso F.
  • Meloni S.
  • Gracia-Lázaro C.
  • Antonioni A.
  • Cuesta J.A.
  • Sánchez A.
  • Moreno Y.
The vast amount of research devoted to public goods games has shown that contributions may be dramatically affected by varying framing conditions. This is particularly relevant in the context of donations to charities and non-governmental organizations. Here, we design a multiple public goods experiment by introducing five types of funds, each differing in the fraction of the contribution that is donated to a charity. We found that people contribute more to public goods when the associated social donations are presented as indirect rather than as direct donations. At the same time, the fraction of the donations devoted to charity is not affected by the framing. We have also found that, on average, women contribute to public goods and donate to charity significantly more than men. These findings are of potential interest to the design of social investment tools, in particular for charities to ask for better institutional designs from policy makers.