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Tesis doctoral (DoctoralThesis)
Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediaries
This thesis is comprised of three chapters. In the first chapter, coauthored with Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, we study the relation between the distribution of common ownership in an industry, aggregate industry outcomes, and the distribution of market shares. We show that increasing common owners’ stakes in a firm need not be anticompetitive and that industry profits can be higher in an industry with a lower average level of common ownership. However, an increase in the size of a common owner that keeps relative ownership stakes constant always has anticompetitive effects. We also show that the equilibrium market structure is closely related to the distribution of sympathy coefficients, which measure the extent to which firm managers care about their rivals’ profits and determine how aggressively firms compete. In particular, the ordering of product market shares is the inverse of the ordering of sympathy coefficients. Aggregate industry outcomes are determined not just by the average level of sympathy but also by the asymmetry in the distribution of sympathy coefficients across firms. In the second chapter, I study the impact of fund voting on mutual fund flows and fees. I characterize fund voting behavior by how supportive a fund is of various types of proposals and by how differently a fund votes compared to its peers. I find no economically or statistically significant effect of mutual fund voting on fund flows or fees. My results suggest that fund investors are not very concerned about fund voting and that market incentives play little or no role in motivating mutual fund voting. In the third chapter, I examine the impact of stricter capital requirements on banks’ activity in the residential mortgage market. After the 2008 financial crisis, the Basel Committee established the Basel III capital framework to enforce stricter capital regulations. This paper examines how banks reacted to these regulations by transferring their mortgage activities to the shadow banking sector. The primary findings indicate that the regulatory adjustments led banks to shift their mortgage origination into the shadow banking sector by a small magnitude. Specifically, a one percentage point decrease in the Tier 1 capital ratio, attributable to the proposed rule, causes banks to transfer 8.15 basis points of their assets into the mortgage shadow banking sector., I am indebted to the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (PGC2018-097187-B-I00) for financing my research., Programa de Doctorado en Empresa y Finanzas / Business and Finance por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Presidente: Juan Pedro Gómez.- Secretaria: María Gutiérrez Urtiaga.- Vocal:
Rafael Zambrana Galacho