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MUNDOS Y VALORES DE VERDAD: RETOS PARA LA SEMANTICA FORMAL

PID2019-107667GB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2019
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
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Docta Complutense
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Neoclassical logic, cloisonnist vagueness, nonobjectual truth

  • Zardini, Elia
In a series of works, Alan Weir has suggested that the paradoxes are due not so much to the operational principles of classical logic, but to some of its structural principles. Weir’s insightful suggestion has opened up the programme of developing a system that, while validating the principles of naive truth (or of naive vagueness), preserves the classical essence of the logical operations and remains coherent by denying instead, in a philosophically motivated way, some of the classical structural principles. This paper first presents Weir’s logical system and argues that it does not adequately preserve operational classicism. The paper then presents Weir’s nontransitive system of vagueness and argues that it does not adequately preserve naive vagueness. The paper finally presents Weir’s nontransitive system of truth and argues that it does not adequately preserve naive truth. As a contrast, the paper mentions how these shortcomings are overcome by my favoured nontransitive system of vagueness and by my favoured noncontractive system of truth.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Verdict exclusion, higher-order vagueness, cross-order vagueness and borderlineness. Reflections on footnote 41 of Crispin Wright’s ‘On being in a quandary'

  • Zardini, Elia
The paper explores an argument offered by C. Wright against the “verdict-exclusion” view (according to which we can knowledgeably rule out that, in the presence of a borderline case of Fness, that case is either feasibly knowably ~F or feasibly knowably ). The view is shared by otherwise very different theories of vagueness, such as the “third-possibility” view (according to which an object’s being a borderline case of Fness is a state which is incompatible both with F’s applying to it and with ~F ’s applying to it) and “pessimistic classical epistemicism” (according to which not only we are not in a position to rule out the possibility that, after all, ~F does apply to the case in question nor the possibility that, after all, ~F does apply to it, we also know that either F or ~F applies to it, and we just cannot know which). After presenting Wright’s original argument against the verdict-exclusion view and proposing a strengthening thereof, the paper considers and eventually rejects a restriction of the verdict-exclusion view, restriction which could be proposed in order to block the argument against it. The paper then identifies a first fundamental problem with the argument, concerning a slide from something’s being a mere consequence to its being a full-blooded characterization. Further, the paper distinguishes two different kinds of vagueness other than first-order vagueness (higher-order vagueness proper and what will be called ‘cross-order vagueness’), and shows that the idea behind the argument against the verdict-exclusion view can be used to build an argument against the definiteness of instances of cross-order borderlineness in the first place, thereby making it clear both that the new argument actually undermines a crucial assumption of Wright’s argument against the verdict-exclusion view and that, anyway, the issue has nothing to do in particular with the verdict-exclusion view. The paper then inquires what the verdict-exclusion view should make of such a result, and argues that both third-possibility theorists and pessimistic classical epistemicists face the novel explanatory challenge of giving a principled answer to the question as to why they are not, after all, committed to the definiteness of some instances of cross-order borderlineness. The paper concludes by generalizing the challenge to all extant theories of vagueness and considering possible avenues of reply.