FINANCIACION EMPRESARIAL NO BANCARIA: PROTECCION DE LOS ACREEDORES Y GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO

PID2019-108503RB-I00

Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2019
Unidad de gestión Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE OVIEDO
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100011033

Publicaciones

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

What drives risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation? Some international evidence

RUO. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Oviedo
  • Abascal, R.
  • González Rodríguez, Francisco
We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful and detailed comments. We would like to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under the project PID2019–108503RB-I00 , and financial support from the Asturias Regional Government to Research Groups under the project AYUD/2021/50878 (Group of Financial Economics).




Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain; [grandes accionistas y costes de agencia de la deuda. El caso español]

RUO. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Oviedo
  • Álvarez Botas, Celia
  • Fernández Méndez, Carlos
  • González Méndez, Víctor Manuel
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation via Projects MCI-20-PID2019-108503RBI00 and PID2022-140940NB-I00 and from the Government of the Principality of Asturias via project (GECOFIN) AYUD/2021/50878 are gratefully acknowledged.




The value of relationship banking: international evidence

RUO. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Oviedo
  • Álvarez Botas, Celia
  • González Méndez, Víctor Manuel
This paper analyses whether repeated borrowing from the same bank affects loan contract terms. We find that relationship loans pay less spread and require less collateral compared to non-relationship loans. These effects for relationship loans are not derived from differences between relationship and nonrelationship loans. The reduction of interest rate spread for relationship loans disappeared during the financial crisis. The results also reveal that borrowers paid higher interest rate spreads, had to post more collateral and the maturity was shortened during the crisis period. The reduction in interest rate spread and collateral depends on the protection of creditors’ rights. In countries where creditors’ rights are well protected, relationship loans pay less spread and are required to post less collateral than relationship loans in countries with weak protection of creditors’ rights., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation via Project MCI-20-PID2019–108503RB-I00 and from
Asturias Regional Government via Project AYUD/2021/50878 are gratefully acknowledged.




Does alternative digital lending affect bank performance? Cross-country and bank-level evidence

RUO. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Oviedo
  • Cuadros Solas, P. J.
  • Cubillas Martín, Elena
  • Salvador, C.
Pedro J. Cuadros acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Projects PID2021-128994NA-I00 and TED2021-132896A-100. Elena Cubillas acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Project




Creditor rights, bank competition, and stability: international evidence

RUO. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Oviedo
  • González Rodríguez, Francisco
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Innovation under the project PID2019–108503RB-I00, and financial support from the Asturias Regional Government to
Research Groups under the project AYUD/2021/50878 (Group of Financial Economics).