BUSCADOR RECOLECTA

Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability., Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Oihane Gallo acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Government through grant PID2021-127119NBI00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by ‘‘ERDF A way of making Europe’’. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from
Universidad Pública de Navarra through grant PJUPNA2023-11403. Oihane Gallo acknowledges the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through Project
100018_192583 as the main financial support. Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra aknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Government through grant
PID2019-107539GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by ‘‘ERDF A way of making Europe’’. Elena Inarra acknowledges financial support
from the Basque Government through grant IT1697-22. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Government through grant
PID2020-115011GB-I00, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033.

We address the problem of assessing the value of a language. We consider a stylized model of multilingual societies in which we introduce axioms formalizing the principles of impartiality, monotonicity, invariance and consistency. We show that the combination of these axioms characterizes a family of communicative benefit functions which assign a value to each language in the society. The functions within the family involve a two-step procedure. First, they identify the groups of agents that can communicate in each language. Second, each group is assigned an aggregate (size-dependent) value, which is evenly divided among the languages in which the group can communicate. Our novel approach could be useful in a wide range of empirical applications and policy decisions., The first author acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through grant PGC2018-093542-B-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by 'ERDF A way of making Europe'. The second author acknowledges the Spanish Government through grant PID2020-115011GB-I00, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Funding for publishing: Universidad Pablo de Olavide/CBUA.

Journal of Mathematical Economics 110 (2024) 102934

How to select participants for a sports tournament when they are divided into different sets, and one should find a fair number of slots for each set? We propose to address this question by resorting to standard tools from the fair allocation literature. To frame our discussion, we focus on the increase in the number of participating teams in the FIFA World Cup. We explore the allocation of additional slots among continental confederations. We consider 10 different allocations. Based on our analysis, we can argue that the European soccer confederation (UEFA) has a solid basis to claim for additional slots.

We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in broadcasting problems are equal treatment of equals, weak equal treatment of equals and symmetry. We study the relationship between all impartiality axioms. Besides we combine anonymity with other axioms that have been considered in the literature. Some combinations give rise to new characterizations of well-known rules. The family of generalized split rules is characterized with anonymity, additivity and null team. The concede-and-divide rule is characterized with anonymity, additivity and essential team. Other and combinations characterize new rules that had not been considered before. We provide three characterizations in which three axioms are the same (anonymity, additivity, and order preservation) and the fourth one is different (maximum aspirations, weak upper bound, and non-negativity). Depending on the fourth axiom we obtain three different families of rules. In all of them concede-and-divide plays a central role.

We develop a unified framework for the measurement and valuation of health and productivity. Within this framework, we characterize evaluation functions allowing for compromises between the classical quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and its polar productivity-adjusted life years (PALYs). Our framework and characterization results provide a new normative basis for the economic evaluation of health care interventions, as well as occupational health and safety policies, aimed to impact both health and productivity of individuals.

We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in broadcasting problems are equal treatment of equals, weak equal treatment of equals and symmetry. We study the relationship between all impartiality axioms. Besides we combine anonymity with other axioms that have been considered in the literature. Some combinations give rise to new characterizations of well-known rules. The family of generalized split rules is characterized with anonymity, additivity and null team. The concede-and-divide rule is characterized with anonymity, additivity and essential team. Other and combinations characterize new rules that had not been considered before. We provide three characterizations in which three axioms are the same (anonymity, additivity, and order preservation) and the fourth one is different (maximum aspirations, weak upper bound, and non-negativity). Depending on the fourth axiom we obtain three different families of rules. In all of them concede-and-divide plays a central role., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-113440GB-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-115011GB-I00, Junta de Andalucía | Ref. P18-FR-2933, Junta de Andalucía | Ref. A-SEJ-14-UGR20, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B2022/03, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG

We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-115011GB-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-113440GB-I00, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B2022/03, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG