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ORGANIZACIONES SOSTENIBLES

PID2020-115018RB-C33

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2020
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS ISLAS BALEARES

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sale versus licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by an outside patentholder

  • Antelo Suárez, Manel
  • Bru, Lluís
We investigate an outside patentholder's choice between selling and licensing a cost-reducing innovation to firms that produce differentiated goods in a Cournot duopoly. Sale implies the transfer of ownership rights, whereas licensing—by the patentholder directly or by any assignee—occurs through an endogenously chosen two-part tariff contract. We find that the patentholder has an incentive to sell the innovation (to a single firm that, in turn, licences it to its competitor) only when the goods are close substitutes and the innovation size is sufficiently minimal. Otherwise, the patentholder prefers to licence the innovation to both firms. Although the transfer of innovation, whether through outright sale or licensing, always improves aggregate welfare compared with the pre-transfer scenario, consumer surplus is reduced when the transfer is made by means of sales. Therefore, a socially optimal public policy should aim at banning the sale of outside innovations or, at least, preventing their subsequent licensing by the assignee from within the industry.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Per-unit versus ad-valorem royalty licensing in a Stackelberg market

  • Antelo Suárez, Manel
  • Bru Martínez, Lluís
We consider licensing of a non-drastic innovation by a licensor that interacts with a potential licensee in a Stackelberg duopoly, comparing per-unit and ad-valorem royalty two-part contracts and showing why and when each licensing deal should be used. We contribute three findings to the literature. First, ad-valorem royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as leader in the marketplace, but per-unit royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as follower. Second, only innovations that do not hurt consumers are socially beneficial. Third, our model also suggests that both the licensor’s status as a leader or follower in the marketplace and the innovation size determine the incentive to engage in innovative activities
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a Stackelberg-differentiated duopoly

  • Antelo Suárez, Manel
  • Bru, Lluís
This study investigates the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a firm to its direct competitor in a Stackelberg-differentiated duopoly. We find that the licensor's market position coupled with the product's nature and innovation size play an important role in framing the licensing agreement and its welfare impact. When acting as the market leader in determining output, the licensor offers its competitor a pure ad valorem royalty contract if the products are close substitutes for each other or if the innovation is sufficiently large in the case of distant substitutes; otherwise, a per-unit royalty combined with a fixed fee is preferred. However, if the licensor acts as a follower in the product market, the licence comprises a per-unit royalty, sometimes combined with a fixed payment. Compared with the pre-licensing context, licensing by a market follower is never welfare-reducing, whereas licensing by a market leader is only welfare-reducing when products are extremely close substitutes. Optimal licensing with complementary products is also studied, which could result in a per-unit subsidy.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Divisionalization in vertical structures

  • Bru, Lluís
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon
  • Ordóñez-de-Haro, José-Manuel
  • Fauli-Oller, Ramon|||/items/08f97cde-d74e-4ff4-bbb5-50cc187ee23b
We evaluate the incentives to create within-industry independent divisions once the vertical structure of the industry is considered. Divisionalization allows a firm to gain market share in the final market, but it also leads to an increase in total payments to the input supplier. The less competitive the upstream market, the more important the second effect will be, and this reduces the profitability of divisionalization. As a consequence, a less competitive upstream segment leads to a lower total number of divisions in equilibrium and a less competitive final market, harming end consumers who will face higher prices.
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Long-Term Versus Short-Term Environmental Tax Policy Under Asymmetric Information

  • Antelo, Manel
  • Bru, Lluis
  • Peón, David
[Abstract] We examine the interaction between a firm that uses either a dirty or a clean technology to produce a product over two periods, 1 and 2, and an environmentally conscious regulator that chooses the environmental tax/subsidy policy. The regulator ignores with which technology the firm manufactures the product and only has a prior belief about it. In this context, if the regulator can credibly commit to the policy for both periods, social welfare is generally higher than if it cannot commit, because distortions in firm's production at period 1 for signalling purposes strongly reduces the optimality of an environmental policy of short duration. A period-by-period policy in which the regulator does not commit to the policy terms for period 2 (which will be contingent to information provided by the firm in period 1) is only optimal when clean technology is very expensive to produce with it and the regulator's environmental concern is not very high. The results highlight the importance of taking into account the time horizon in policymaking, as well as the limitations of regulatory policies that seek to elicit information about the type of technology used by firms., Manel Antelo acknowledges financial support from Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Ordenación Universitaria (Xunta de Galicia) through Grant Consolidación e estruturación – 2019 GRC GI-2016 Análise económica dos mercados e institucións and Lluís Bru from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation through Grant PID 2020-115018RB-C33, Xunta de Galicia; 2019 GRC GI-2016
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Using pledges to improve the effectiveness of environmental information campaigns: the case of biowaste recycling

  • Alonso-Paulí, Eduard
  • Balart, Pau
  • Ezquerra, Lara
  • Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo
Through a field study (N = 1,519) that uses a technology to record real-time data on waste sorting, we find that offering the opportunity to sign a pledge increases the effectiveness of an environmental campaign. With a timespan of over four years, the pledge increased waste sorting participation by 4.55 to 5.10 percentage points (SD = 0.1997). The effect is greater immediately after the campaign (around 9 to 10 pp during the first 15 wk), but it remains sizable and statistically significant 150 to 210 wk after signing (3.11 to 4.45 pp). Continue Reading, Financial support from Grant TED2021-129798A-I00 funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR. I.H.-A. acknowledges the financial support from Grant PID2021-127119NB-I00 and PID2022-138774NBI00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by ¿ERDF A way of making Europe.¿ E.A.-P. thanks Grant PID2020-115018RB-C33 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033.