Pasar al contenido principal

REPRESENTATIVIDAD, INCENTIVOS Y ESTABILIDAD

PID2022-138111NB-I00

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2022
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Corrigendum to “Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule” [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308–318]

  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Alcalde, Jose|||/items/d21b8ab0-26c7-49da-a3bb-f2668a1574ac
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
We prove that the “Boston mechanism” designed by Bogomolnaia [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308–318] to solve the random assignment problem fails to be lexicographically strategy-proof. Consequently, an open question emerges: Is the Serial rule the unique solution satisfying envy-freeness, efficiency and strategy-proofness on the lexicographic preference domain extension for lotteries?
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Cooperative TU-games: Dominance, stable sets, and the core revisited

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
Stable sets are introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as “the solution” of a cooperative game. Later on, Gillies (1953) defines the core of the game. Both notions can be established in terms of dominance. It is well known that the core may be an empty set, whereas stable sets may fail to exist, or may produce different proposals. We provide a new dominance relation so that the stable set obtained when applying this notion (the δ-stable set) always exists, it is unique, and it coincides with the core of the cooperative game, whenever the core is not empty. We apply this concept to some particular classes of TU-games having typically an empty core: voting (majority) games, minimum cost spanning trees games with revenue, controlled capacitated networks, or m-sequencing games.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity

  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Dahm, Matthias
  • Alcalde, Jose|||/items/d21b8ab0-26c7-49da-a3bb-f2668a1574ac
Refugee resettlement is one of the most important challenges of our time. We consider a set of host States required to collectively provide a given number of resettlement places. International cooperation must be voluntary, but host States can be compensated. We first show that a market approach can generate sufficient resettlement places. However, there are pervasive opportunities for manipulation. We reformulate the Ausubel (2004) auction as a procurement auction for resettlement places, but allow for the possibility that procurement costs are covered by the participants in the auction (Cramton et al., 2013). This Compensation Mechanism determines a (heterogeneous) set of transfers in exchange for resettlement places provided and allows host States to specialise in providing places or finance resettlement in other States. We show that sincere bidding is a dominant strategy and that it leads to efficient allocations of the required number of places.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Non-emptiness of the core of mcst games with revenues

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The minimum cost spanning tree (mest) problem analyzes how to efficiently connect geographically dispersed agents to a common source. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) study mest problems involving revenues, in which the agents benefit from being connected to the source. A key feature of their framework is that only certain coalitions, called effective coalitions, make sense to form. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) show that the core in cost–revenue mest games is typically empty. In this paper, we present a necessary condition that mest games with revenues need to fulfill to ensure the non-emptiness of the core: the existence of at least one agent with veto power, i.e., an agent whose participation is required in every effective coalition. Additionally, we extend the sufficient condition in Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) for elementary cost mest problems.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement

  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Dahm, Matthias
  • Alcalde, Jose|||/items/d21b8ab0-26c7-49da-a3bb-f2668a1574ac
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to rely on a diverse pool of suppliers, besides achieving cost effectiveness. Common wisdom, however, holds that these two aims are in conflict. We explore a model of dual sourcing and propose complementing a share auction with affirmative action to create an endogenous set-aside for a high-cost supplier. In our model more intensive affirmative action strengthens the targeted provider. This has the potential to level the playing field, inducing more competitive procurement overall. Our main result provides a condition under which the endogenous set-aside not only guarantees a very substantial share for the high-cost supplier, but also reduces the buyer's provision cost compared to a standard auction. We also illustrate how our approach can help reducing the severity and likelihood of health product shortages, such as those occurred during the COVID-19 outbreak.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Irreducible minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The current paper analyzes minimum cost spanning tree problems having irreducible costs while incorporating revenues. We prove that, in this context, the core of the associated cost-revenues game (the r-core) is non-empty. In particular, we find an stable allocation in the r-core, based on the CEL bankruptcy rule, that ensures fairness by distributing revenues only among agents that belong to every effective coalition. Therefore, our findings contribute to the literature by identifying structural conditions that guarantee stability in minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues, overcoming previous results which showed that the r-core could be empty.