Pasar al contenido principal

ESTUDIOS MICROECONOMICOS SOBRE LA TOMA DE DECISIONES INDIVIDUALES Y LA INTERACCION ESTRATEGICA

PID2023-147136NB-I00

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2023
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Do giving voice and social information help in revising a misconception about rent control?

  • Brandts, Jordi|||0000-0001-9082-9258
  • Busom i Piquer, Isabel|||0000-0001-9621-369X
  • López-Mayán Navarrete, Cristina|||0000-0001-7206-1476
Citizens' ability to make informed and thoughtful choices when voting for policy proposals rests on their exposure to accurate information about the costs and benefits that each proposal entails. We study whether certain social factors affect the disposition to drop a misconception, the belief that rent control increases the availability of affordable housing. We design an on-line experiment where all participants watch a video explaining the scientific evidence on the consequences of this policy. We test whether letting them give feedback (giving voice) and informing them about others' change of beliefs (social information) helps in reducing the misconception. Giving voice does not have an additional effect relative to a benchmark group that only watches the video. Social information further reduces the misconception when it specifies how different groups of people have responded to the video, but not when these distinctions are not made. Additionally, changes in beliefs translate into intended voting against the policy, and into recommending the video. Finally, ideological position and a zero-sum mentality are correlated with the initial misconception, but these two factors do not hinder the disposition to dropping it following the intervention.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Online academic exams: Does multiplicity of exam versions mitigate cheating?

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study academic integrity in a final exam of a game theory course with 463 undergraduate students at a major Spanish university. The exam is an unproctored online multiple-choice exam without backtracking. A key characteristic is that for each (type of) problem, groups of students receive different versions. Moreover, each problem version is assigned to one subgroup during one stage of the exam and to another subgroup during an immediately consecutive later stage. Thus, we can exploit grade points and timestamps to study students’ academic integrity. We observe a significant decrease in completion time at each later stage; however, surprisingly, there is no corresponding impact on average grade points. The precise number of different versions does not seem to have an effect on either variable. Our findings thus suggest that employing a limited number of distinct problem versions (as few as two) can diminish cheating effectiveness in online exams., Flip Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2021-SGR-00416) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033) through grant PID2020-114251GB-I00, PID2023-147136NB-I00, and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915- S). MarcVorsatz gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant PID2021-122919-NB-I00., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Sethuraman, Jay
We provide the first characterization of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism in the Shapley–Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) that uses respecting-improvement. Specifically, we show that for strict preferences, the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying pair-efficiency, respecting-improvement, and strategy-proofness., Bettina Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through Project 100018_212311. Flip Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2021-SGR-00416) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (MCIN/ AEI/10.13039/501100011033) through grant PID2023-147136NB-I00 and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). We are grateful to the organizers of the workshop on Online Stochastic Matching at the Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse (IMT) in September 2024 for providing a stimulating environment that seeded the initial ideas of this project., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Özbilen, Seçkin
We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into “friends” and “enemies” such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends. We show that the partition associated with the strongly connected components (SCC) of the friendship graph is in the strict core. We then prove that the SCC mechanism, which assigns the SCC partition to each hedonic coalition formation problem with friend-oriented preferences, satisfies a strong group incentive compatibility property: group strategy-proofness. Our main result is that on any “rich” subdomain of friend-oriented preferences, the SCC mechanism is the only mechanism that satisfies core stability and strategy-proofness., B. Klaus gratefully acknowledges support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNFS) through Project 100018_192583. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2021-SGR-00416) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through grant PID2020-114251GB-I00 and PID2023-147136NB-I00 (funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S and CEX2024-001476-S). This research was initiated when S. Özbilen was a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Economics at HEC, University of Lausanne. He thanks this institution for its hospitality and gratefully acknowledges support from the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye (TÜBİTAK) for project 1059B191900218., Peer reviewed