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THE GROUNDS OF ARTISTIC RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF APPROPRIATION

PID2023-147445NA-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2023
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Authenticity in aesthetics

  • Windsor, Mark
  • García Carril Puy, Nemesio
Authenticity is an important and widely used concept in aesthetics. Yet it is also a contested and elusive one. In this article, we clarify the concept of authenticity as it is used in aesthetic discourse. Authenticity, we argue, is a term used to assert the truth of something possessing some contextually relevant feature that it is purported to have. Typically, however, this has an evaluative or normative dimension: the feature that an authenticity attribution verifies is either part of what grounds the object's aesthetic value or is normatively required by the aesthetic practice to which it belongs. We then propose a taxonomy of applications of authenticity according to the type of contextually relevant feature an object must possess to count as authentic—material authenticity, work authenticity, cultural authenticity, and personal authenticity. Using these categories, we provide a roadmap for navigating recent debates on authenticity in aesthetics.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A twist on the historically authentic musical performance

  • García Carril Puy, Nemesio
According to the mainstream view in the philosophy of music, the only way to authentically perform works of past centuries is according to the ideal of Historically Authentic Performance (HAP). This paper aims to show that, despite recent defences of the mainstream view, it lacks motivation, and hence should be abandoned or revised. As we shall see, first, there is no plausible account of HAP as a final and intrinsic value consistent with the work-focused teleology of work-performance. Second, a plausible account of the value of HAP in work-performance regards HAP as a way of performing works of past centuries convincingly. However, this approach does not support the mainstream view because this only leaves HAP as an interpretive option. Finally, an alternative defence of the value of HAP in the form of an indispensability argument is considered: HAP is indispensable to accurately comply with a work’s score, and thus to perform it faithfully. This strategy supports the demands of the mainstream view, but we will see that, if we take this option seriously, HAP must be understood in a substantively different manner than the mainstream view does, such that it ultimately amounts to the second option analysed above.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Structural universals, types and musical works

  • García Carril Puy, Nemesio
The view of musical works as structural universals has been recently presented as a plausible candidate to explain the nature of works of Western classical music. According to A. R. J. Fisher (2023), this view explains five basic intuitions about musical works’ nature: manifestation, repeatability, creatability, destructibility and persistence after the composer’s death. Fisher argues that the structural universalist view is superior to type/token theories insofar as the latter fail to explain destructibility and offer complicated explanations of creatability. And, in case they explain the same phenomena alike, the structural universalist view should be preferred to type/token theories because it is more parsimonious. This paper questions the appeal of the structural universalist view over type/token theories. First, we shall see that the structural universalist view cannot explain musical works’ destructibility without denying other basic intuitions about the persistence of musical works. Second, the structural universalist view will be revealed as unable to explain the creatability intuition properly, even in a complicated way as type/token theories do. And third, the simple way in which type/token theories explain how a musical work is the intentional object of performances, interpretations and appreciation will be contrasted with the difficulties faced by the structural universalist view. These three points will support the idea that the structural universalist view has less explanatory power than type/token theories in musical ontology, which in turn undermines the argument from parsimony against type/token theories.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Triviality and solipsism: two problems in the metaontology of art and a goodmanian solution

  • García Carril Puy, Nemesio
Amie Thomasson’s descriptivism and Julian Dodd’s revisionism are two outstanding opposed views within the methodological debate in the metaontology of art. In this paper, I argue that none of them provide an adequate methodology for the ontology of artworks insofar as they do not secure ontological accounts to play a substantive role in improving our understanding of artworks and the practices they involve. Thomasson’s descriptivism faces a problem of triviality, unjustifiably reducing art ontology to a trivial task. In turn, Dodd’s revisionary approach faces a problem of solipsism, being a methodology that does not ensure conceptual mediation between the ontology of art and artistic practices. Finally, I will sketch a solution for both problems based on Nelson Goodman’s distinction between entrenchment and familiarity of a predicate.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Composers’ mistakes and their correction in performance

  • Dodd, Julian
  • García Carril Puy, Nemesio
This paper identifies a previously unrecognized, and philosophically interesting, kind of mistake that can be made by a composer in composing a work of Western classical music. Specifically, she may err by writing some scored instructions for performance that undercut the meaning of her own work. Since following those instructions would frustrate the most fundamental purpose of performing that work—namely, to evince understanding of it—the practice of work-performance sanctions performers to correct those mistakes in performance by departing from the score where necessary. The possibility of this kind of mistake and their correction lies, we argue, in the distinction between a work’s meaning and its elaboration in the scored instructions for performance. We substantiate this claim and defend it against the tight constraint thesis, the view that a work’s meaning is determined by the totality of its score’s instructions. This thesis will be revealed to be both in conflict with the manifest image of our performance practice and philosophically unmotivated. Finally, we consider the scope of the composer’s authority in light of the possibility of the sort of mistakes and their correction that concern us here.
Docta Complutense
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The artifactual duality of architecture and its ontological implications for legal protection

  • García Carril Puy, Nemesio
This paper analyzes the peculiarity of some architectural works being artifacts designed to on a par perform typically divorced functions. Like technical artifacts, they are primarily intended to fulfill specific practical functions related to our everyday life. Simultaneously, some of them are intended to primarily perform an artistic function as well. This artifactual duality involves relevant challenges for determining their ontological nature and normative issues related to their legal protection. The practical and artistic functions of an architectural artifact may occasionally come into conflict and its owners often decide to modify it for a better fulfillment of its practical functions. Architects sometimes feel harmed in their moral rights qua artists when those modifications are unconsented. As we shall see, the doctrine of moral rights strongly suggests ontologically categorizing architectural works as concrete particulars. However, the artistic function of architectural works motivates the view that they are to be protected by intellectual property law too. The problem is that the objects protected by intellectual property law are intangible entities that motivate their categorization as artifact types, which is inconsistent with seeing architectural works as concrete particulars. As a solution, the plausibility of categorizing architectural works as artifact types will be explored as an ontological account that may reconcile architects’ aims and intuitions regarding both moral and intellectual property rights over their works.