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LECCIONES DE LA ECONOMIA DEL COMPORTAMIENTO: JUEGOS, REDES Y GENERO

PID2023-147817NB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2023
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DEL PAIS VASCO EUSKAL HERRIKO UNIBERTSITATEA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Distributive preferences and effort provision: A two-way link?

  • Kovářík, Jaromír
  • Martínez-Macías, Ibai
  • Miller, Luis M.
This paper examines the relationship between effort and distributive preferences in a setting where effort does not affect the total amount available for distribution. While prior research has shown a link from effort to distributive preferences, we provide empirical evidence of the reverse relationship: individuals who make egalitarian choices exert less effort one year later compared to those who act selfishly. To test this, we use a unique dataset from participants who participated in a real-effort experiment with distributional choices on two distinct occasions, one year apart. Our findings offer an explanation for the self-serving interpretations of fairness observed in the literature and underscore the role of distributive preferences as a key determinant of effort and productivity., Financial support from PID2019-106146GB-I00 and PID2023-147817NB-I00 by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by “ERDF A way of making Europe” and the Basque Government, Spain (IT1461-22) is gratefully acknowledged, Peer reviewed
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games

  • García Pola, Bernardo
  • Iriberri, Nagore
Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals' initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents' past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initial play modify their behavior after they learn about past behavior? This study links initial and repeated play in two different types of games (11-20 and 3 × 3 normal-form games) using a within-subject laboratory design. We classify individuals as following different behavioral rules in initial and repeated play and test whether and/or how strategic naivete and sophistication in initial play correlate with naivete and sophistication in repeated play. We find no evidence of a positive correlation between naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play., This project was supported by a 2018 Leonardo Grant for Researchers and Cultural Creators, BBVA Foundation. The Foundation accepts no responsibility for the opinions, statements and contents included in the project and/or the results thereof, which are entirely the responsibility of the authors. Nagore Iriberri acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (PID2023-147817NB-I00) and the Basque Government (IT1697-22). Bernardo García-Pola acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (PID2022-138774NB-I00, PID2021-127119NB-I00).